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7Foreword
The ship called Serbia is sailing through rough waters, as always. Eco-
nomic and social situation has certainly been improved during the last 
decade, but dissatisfaction with the achieved results is widespread among 
both the general public and the experts. It is believed that many rocks lurk 
beneath the water and that caution is a reasonable strategy. The main rea-
son for caution is that politics, both domestic and external, has more often 
than not been an obstacle to the economic and social progress.
The book in front of the reader represents an attempt by the CLDS 
team to show, in an unbiased way, where Serbia is in terms of economic 
and social situation, what the risks are and how could be proceeded with 
reforms. Therefore, short texts present and analyze the process of institu-
tional reforms in Serbia, economic and social policies and their achieve-
ments, current problems and some proposals for remedying them.
It is our strong belief that difficulties can be overcome and that faster 
economic and social development is possible. It remains to be seen 
whether that will be accomplished.
Boško Mijatović

9Key Macroeconomic Imbalances and Risks
High rates of economic growth recently recorded by the economy of 
Serbia have been achieved amidst increasing macroeconomic imbal-
ances: dual deficit, rising inflation, low domestic savings and increasing 
external debt. Indicators of economic vulnerability of Serbia have far 
exceeded the level recorded in the countries that experienced financial 
crisis, which certainly presents a good cause for concern and for an 
assessment of the risk that the crisis may occur here as well. Certainly, 
this risk is mitigated by the EU convergence processes, as well as by the 
increase in foreign direct investments; however, poorly developed insti-
tutions and soft budget constraints, which is still predominant in the 
business environment of Serbia, maintain this risk at a rather high level. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the vulnerability indicators 
and provide an assessment of the level of risk Serbia is exposed to in this 
moment.
 The vulnerability indicators show that Serbia is aggravating its posi-
tion, primarily due to a strong increase in the current account deficit. 
Compared to other countries, the vulnerability indicators are still more 
favorable than in the region, but are dramatically deteriorating in Ser-
bia, although they are still at a rather “safe” level. 
INCREASING FISCAL IMBALANCE
1. For the last eight years of transition, Serbia has significantly 
improved its fiscal system. Numerous quasi-fiscal activities of the 
central bank have been ended, special budgetary funds and “special” 
accounts eliminated and the Treasury formed, thus creating a basis for 
pursuing sound fiscal policy. Delays in the payment of pensions and 
children’s allowances now belong to the past, and the outstanding pay-
ments and frozen foreign currency savings have gradually been almost 
completely repaid. (As late as) at the beginning of the fifth year of 
transition, the value-added tax was introduced as well, whereby the 
initial reform of Serbia’s fiscal system was completed. In the 2000–
2005 period, the Republic budget was passed under the watchful 
attention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose consent 
was one of the tacit but key assumptions for passing the budget. Since 
2006 Serbia has had no arrangement with the IMF. According to the 
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11Key Macroeconomic Imbalances and Risks
official methodology of the Ministry of Finance, this has not caused 
loosening of fiscal discipline in Serbia. However, according to the 
IMF methodology, since the termination of the IMF arrangement, 
Serbia has been recording a fiscal deficit.1 
Table 2 
Consolidated public spending in Serbia, 2001–2008
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
I –III 
Gross Domestic 
Product 1020 1171.6 1431.3 1747.5 2042.0 2393. 0
PUBLIC REVENUES, 
bln RSD 407 472.7 589.4  701.7  84 6.9 988.6  
Total revenues, 
as % of GDP 39.9% 40.3% 41.2% 40.2% 41.5 % 41.3%  
PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE  43 8.6  4 8 5.3 576.5 665.4 811.8 977.7 238.2
Total expenditure, 
as % of GDP  43.0%  41. 4% 4 0.3%  38 .1% 39.8 % 40.9%  
 Consolidated 
deficit/surplus – 31.6 – 1 2.6 13  3 6.2  35.1 10.9 2 0. 7
Deficit / surplus 
(MoF method.), in 
% of GDP
 –3.1 %  –1.1% 0.9 %  2,1% 1,7% 0,5%
Deficit (IMF 
methodology), 
%GDP 
–4,2 –3 0 0.7  –1.5 –1*) 
*) estimate 
Source: Consolidated General Government Revenues and Expenditures, 6.5.2008, MoF 
web page, IMF Country Report No. 08/55
2. The existing share of public spending of over 40% of GDP is too 
high and unsustainable, and the internal balance in the medium-term 
critically depends on fiscal sustainability. The expansionist fiscal policy 
from the previous years led to an accelerated increase in real wages 
(15.3% per year on average in the last five years, while the annual GDP 
growth in this period was about 5.6% on average).2
1 The differences result from the different treatment of non-tax revenue originating 
from privatization, which the IMF does not include in tax revenue, while accord-
ing to the IMF methodology the expenditure increases by the payment of debt to 
pensioners.
2 At the same time, in the first three years (2001–2003) the average real increase in 
wages was 20%, while in the 2004–2007 period it decreased to 12%. A high increase 
was recorded in the sub-period May 2006–May 2007 (see Table 3).
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Such an increase in wages and spending gave a significant contribu-
tion to the high foreign trade deficit, which was finally transferred to 
double-digit inflation and threatens to seriously endanger macroeco-
nomic stability. The deficit itself was originally financed by grants and 
later by foreign borrowing and privatization proceeds.
The maintenance of oversized budget thus proves to be harmful in 
two ways: not only that it crowds out private investment and decelerates 
economic growth but also an excessive portion of privatization proceeds 
goes to consumption, which presents a classic example of disinvestment. 
In addition, the privatization proceeds are drying up, so there are 
announcements that a liquidity deficit could appear in September, 
which may only be avoided by a larger privatization.3 For the time being 
there is not even a mention of reducing any expenditures for the pur-
pose of avoiding the liquidity deficit. 
3. A special vulnerability here is that the fiscal deficit would signifi-
cantly endanger external macroeconomic stability. The IMF research 
shows that an increase in fiscal deficit in Serbia by 1% of GDP increases 
the balance of payments deficit by the same percentage, which makes 
the problem rather complex (IMF Country Report No. 08/55). Simi-
larly, the expected decrease in the privatization proceeds and the con-
sequent increase of the fiscal deficit would create a need for govern-
ment borrowing for the purpose of covering the fiscal deficit as well as 
for the purpose of repaying the public debt. In that case, the absence 
of fiscal adjustment could result in a relatively rapid increase in Ser-
bia’s public debt.
4. The basic reason of maintaining high public spending and increas-
ing fiscal deficit lies in the political situation in Serbia, where coalition 
governments do not last long, while spending a good portion of their 
term in searching how to increase political rating and prepare for the 
next election campaign. Even the surplus from the first half of 2007 was 
realized solely due to the regulation on provisional budget financing, 
which caused an (unintended) fiscal tightening. However, immediately 
after the government formation in the second half of the year the expen-
diture was more than compensated for. Like last year, a surplus of RSD 
7 billion was recorded in the first four months of 2008 as well. It is real-
istic, however, to assume that after the government formation in the 
second half of this year the last year’s scenario will be repeated and that 
the previous saving will rapidly melt away. In addition to that, the 
announcement of a “socially responsible government”, which would 
have a task to make the average pensions reach 70 percent of the average 
wage would lead to a further increase in expenditure in 2009 by RSD 
114 billion above the expenses specified for these purposes by current 
3 For example, according to the Minister of Finance, the sale of the NIS oil industry 
company by the end of the year would prevent that liquidity deficit.
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regulations.4 In that scenario, every sixth dinar of the budget would go 
to pension increase, which would either require more considerable cuts 
in other budget expenditure or lead to government borrowing and fur-
ther inflation increase.
5. In recent years, budget capital expenditure increased its GDP share 
from 1.9% in 2005 to 3% in 2006 and to 4% in 2007, which relates to the 
National Investment Plan. The initially prepared 2007 budget did not 
include expenditure related to the National Investment Plan, and when 
upon the IMF insistence this expenditure was included and the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the third mobile telephony license were excluded 
from the revenue side, the budget turned from the surplus of about 0.5% 
of GDP into a deficit of over 1% of GDP (according to the IMF method-
ology). Extra-budgetary public investments are planned as well: gov-
ernment external borrowing (EUR 740 million for the modernization 
of clinical centers, improvement of irrigation systems and similar), issu-
ance of guarantees for borrowing by public companies (EUR 840 mil-
lion primarily for JP Putevi Srbije – Public Road Management Company 
and JP Železnice Srbije – Public Railway Company). Increase in public 
investments (and spending) on this basis, according to rough estimates, 
will be about 1–2% of GDP.5
6. Just like the increase in capital expenditure, the growth in nominal 
wages during 2006–2007 was primarily caused by political cycle and 
contributed to the previous government winning a new term. At the 
same time, the wage increase was not equal for all sectors. The lowest 
growth rate was recorded in the manufacturing industry (of about 20 
percent), which is still higher than the productivity growth, which, 
according to the IMF estimate, was 13–14 % in the same period6. In the 
public sector, the increase in real wages in this period was almost 30 
percent, while here the productivity growth almost exclusively due to 
layoffs, whereby the employment in this period decreased by two per-
centage points.7
4 The increase in expenses by RSD 114 billion relates to the increase in relation to 
pension expenditure under current regulations. It consists of two components: the 
first is (one-shot) increase in pensions by one fourth; the second is the changed 
indexation system, according to which future movement of pensions would be 
indexed solely to wage movement.
5 Source : FREN http://www.fren.org.yu/docs/NDE_Nova-inflacija_DEC07pdf.pdf
6 IMF, Serbia’s Unsustainable Wage Increases – Who Will Pay? September 2007, 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/SCG/rr/2007/090107.pdf
7 According to the RSO data – Semi-annual report on employees and employee 
wages RAD-1/P
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Table 3 
Pre-election increase in real wages, May 2007–May 2006 
 (два на е сто ме сеч ни раст пла та, у %)
All sectors 26
Insurance 55
Health and social care 42
Post and telecom 42
Electricity 39
Construction 34
Air transport 30
Education 28
Banking 26
Manufacturing 20
Source: RSO (ZP11), IMF, Serbia’s Unsustainable Wage Increases – Who Will Pay? 
September 2007 
Figure 1 
Growth in real gross wages 2004–2007
Source: RSO data. Wages in public sector are higher because part of the wages is 
financed from own income. 
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However, their term lasted only one year, so in May 2008 the country 
faced a problem of sustainability of macroeconomic stability in near 
future. The double-digit inflation, the high balance of payments deficit, 
the appreciated dinar exchange rate and great political promises that 
they will continue with populist policy almost present an ideal recipe 
for liquidity crisis, which would distance foreign investors even more 
from the intention to invest in Serbia and thereby fill the budget (in the 
short term) and increase employment, income and possibly reduce the 
balance of payments deficit (in the longer term). 
Figure 2 
Gross wages in dinnars, 2004–2008
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Source: RSO. Wages in public sector are higher than those presented because part of the 
wages is financed from own income. 
7. Regardless of the official announcements of reduction of public 
spending share in GDP in 2008, the chances that it would be realized 
are poor. The reform of the pension system, health and public adminis-
tration deeply infringes upon the acquired rights, so its implementation 
requires strong political will and at least a consensus of government, 
employers and trade unions in principle, which is currently unimagi-
nable. The announcement of fiscal relaxation and full affirmation of the 
concept of welfare state in the election campaign leave little room for 
restrictive fiscal policy once after the government is finally constituted. 
However, it would be necessary to reduce the share of wages as well as 
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the share of subsidies and expenditure for the purchase of goods and 
services in GDP. Elimination of hidden deficits and non-payments 
within public companies would also help further reduction of the share 
of public spending, which is necessary primarily because this policy 
permanently “dooms” the public spending to remain low in absolute 
amounts. Therefore, a reduction of budget spending presents an imper-
ative, whose delay will be very expensive. 
8. Privatization of public enterprises or introduction of hard bud-
get constraint remains an imperative for sustainable development, 
observed from the macroeconomic level. Privatization is necessary 
because in Serbia there is a number of privileged state-owned compa-
nies that call themselves “strategic” and to which, as long as they are 
state-owned, the strict climate of bankruptcy and liquidation will not 
apply, while the culture of non-payment and “clientelism” may not be 
rooted out. Experiences of successful transition economies show that 
the soft budget constraint was not completely abolished until the 
privatization of large public companies. However, the privatization of 
these companies rises numerous questions related to the methods, 
procedure, scope and dynamics of privatization, pre-privatization 
restructuring, desirable industry structure and appropriate economic 
regulation, and the answers to these questions vary from one infra-
structure activity to another. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of 
political economy of such privatization, the political parties that man-
age them at that moment become losers, and therefore party officials 
immediately react to any announcement of the possibility of privatiza-
tion with explanations that such solutions are “bad for the country”, 
whatever it may mean, so strong opposition to privatization of public 
companies may be expected. 
INCREASING ExTERNAL IMBALANCE AND DEBT TREND
9. Since the beginning of transition, the current account deficit has 
increased from 10% (previously considered to be the critical medium-
term limit of sustainable current account deficit) to 16.3% of GDP. 
The coverage of imports by exports does not exceed 50% (during 2007 
it decreased from 46.8 to 45.7 percent). Compared to other countries 
of similar size, Serbia obviously belongs to relatively closed econo-
mies: the total volume of Serbia’s trade does not reach even 80% of 
GDP, while in the other countries it ranges between 130–170% of GDP. 
Except in the remittance account, where Serbia regularly achieves a 
high and increasing surplus, a deficit was recorded in all other 
accounts.
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Table 4 
Serbia’s balance of payments current account balance 2001–2007
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Foreign trade 
deficit, mil.€    –5311 –4280 –4982 –6414
(% of GDP) –24.5 –25.2 –23.6 –26,83 –20.39 –20.01 –20.91
Current account    –2197 –1805 –3137 –4999
(% GDP) –4.6 –8.9 –7.3 –11.1 –8.6 –12.6 –16.3
Memo: Foreign 
reserves, mil.€ 1320 2175 2840 3117 4935 9025 9369
8 
Source: NBS and RSO 93698
10. The key source of large foreign trade deficit consists of (still) 
low exports, which at the beginning of the transition were barely 
15% of gross domestic product. In 2007 the exports reached a third 
of GDP, while the imports reached a half of GDP (normal values in 
the countries of similar size are between 50 and 80% of GDP), which 
means that the exports do not reach half the share in GDP that would 
be necessary in a growing, open economy. A positive tendency, how-
ever, is that the exports record a very rapid increase of over 20 per-
cent per year, which constatnly increases the foreign currency inflow 
and has a favorable impact on the possibility of repaying increasing 
credit obligations in the following period. (compare the Table in 
Item 13), Exports underwent significant changes towards deindus-
trialization. The structure of the first ten products exported to the 
EU changed radically as well: the exports of machines and car parts 
decreased from over 15% to under 5%, while the agricultural prod-
ucts increased their share from 4.8 to over 20 percent. The leading 
export products have been iron, steel, tires, aluminum sheets, sugar, 
corn etc.
The increase in exports of agricultural products came as a result of a 
preferential status that Serbia has in the EU market, as well as a liberal-
ization in trade with the West Balkan countries. The surplus in the trade 
in finished textile products is also a consequence of the signed Agree-
ment with the EU and the preferential status our goods enjoy. However, 
the increase in the world prices of base metals and increase in the eco-
nomic activity in the world also contributed to the accelerated increase 
of Serbia’s exports. At the top of the list of imported products are oil and 
gas, passenger cars, medicines etc. The current poor exports structure is 
however helped by the fact that terms of trade are changing in favor of 
primary products, but unfortunately the most important imported 
product of Serbia – oil – will become more expensive by approximately 
8 In March 2008 foreign reserves amounted to 9.553 billion euros..
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the same percentage. The largest export markets of Serbia are Italy, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. At the same time, the largest 
imports came from Russia, Germany and Italy. 
11. The balance of payments current account deficit, which in the last 
twelve months increased from 3 to 5 billion euros (from 12.6% to 16.3% 
of GDP) does not need to be considered a priori an ultimate sign of eco-
nomic performance deterioration.9 Although it is certainly clear that 
the balance of payments deficit implies that the economy invests more 
than it is possible to generate from domestic savings (whether private 
(S-I) or national (T-G))10, this relation cannot explain the dynamic con-
nection between savings, investments, growth and debt. Therefore, in 
interpreting the balance of payments deficit in the transition countries, 
it is best to use the relation
CAD=(Y*–Y)–(I*–I)–(G*–G), 
where the Y is gross domestic product (GDP) and where the asterisk 
designates long-term level of the variable (compare Obstfeld and Rog-
off, 1996). It may be expected that a country has a current account defi-
cit (CAD) if either GDP or investments or public spending – or all of 
them – are above their long-term level. All three phenomena are in fact 
related to the first phases of transition, where both domestic product, 
investments and public consumption stay above their long term level. It 
becomes obvious also that a fiscal reform could well lead to a decrease 
in current account deficit. For all these reasons, a high level of current 
account deficit in the first phases of transition should not be considered 
an anomaly but a phenomenon that inevitably accompanies the process 
of catching up with developed economies.
Analyses of financial and currency crises in transition economies 
(Russia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania) confirm such 
approach. As it turns out, the crises did not occur as a current account 
problem but as a result of insufficient supervision in the banking system 
(Albania, Bulgaria), or as a result of absence of reform of tax system and 
government spending (Romania, the Czech Republic), while Russia, 
even had a current account surplus, and the collapse did not occur as a 
balance of payments crisis, but rather as a the self-fulfilling prophesy 
that resulted from the expectation that the Russian state would eventu-
ally stop servicing the increasingly heavy burden of interest on debts. 
(compare Sanfey, FREN 10/08). 
9 It would have classified Serbia among the absolute record holders in terms of the 
level of balance of payments deficit in the region, if a record deficit of 30% of GDP 
had not been realized in the meantime in Montenegro. 
10 Current account deficit of a country equals the gap between domestic private sav-
ings and investments (S-I) on one side, and national savings, i.e. budget deficit 
(T-G), on the other. The deficit itself is financed by foreign savings, which may be 
in the form of inflows that increase capital (investment from abroad) or inflows 
that increase debts, i.e. from external borrowing. 
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12. The increasing current account deficit is financed from foreign 
savings, partly in the form of borrowing, and partly by foreign direct 
investments.11 It is important to emphasize a constant increase in sum 
of medium-term and short-term loans, which in 2007 reached the level 
of over EUR 3 billion. The total debt of Serbia in May 2008 was EUR 
17.6 billion, of which EUR 11.6 billion was private debt. At the same 
time, the private sector gradually shifts from official (government) to 
private sources, mostly to foreign banks that extend loans to their 
branches in Serbia. This trend causes an increasing concern and raises 
the issue of sustainability of Serbia’s external debt. 
Table 5 
Indebtedness level criteria and Serbia’s debt in 2001–2007
 High indebtedness Average indebtedness Low indebtedness
Debt/GDP x>80% 48%<x<80% x≤48%
Debt/Exports y>220% 132%<y<220% y≤132%
 
Serbia
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Debt/GDP 94.2 70.9  66.7 57.5 59.1 64.5 64.5
Debt/Exports 456.9 379.5 343 253.6 234.2 228.1 222.5
Source: NBS, Inflation Report, Indicators of Serbia’s external position, May 2008
However, according to the World Bank criteria, after 2005 Serbia no 
longer belongs to highly indebted countries. Despite the still relatively 
low exports, the capacity of debt repayment has increased sufficiently to 
classify Serbia among averagely indebted countries. However, attention 
should also be drawn to the fact that the due obligations have been 
increasing heavily since 2007, and that this inevitably leads to the dete-
rioration of the external liquidity indicators (debt repayment share in 
GDP and debt repayment share in the annual exports of Serbia). The 
estimates of sustainability of external liquidity show that Serbia’s exports 
must increase at a rate higher than 15% per year in order to generate 
enough funds for servicing due repayments.12 
 
13. Liquidity risk In addition to total debt, when examining vul-
nerability of an economy it is of interest to determine the liquidity 
risk, primarily because the economy that faces a high bill in near 
future will more probably fall into a crisis than the economy that 
11 During 2006, foreign investments more than covered the deficit, so the room for 
borrowing was thus significantly expanded.
12 So far, exports were growing by 20%, and same growth is estimated in future.
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Figure 3 
Current account deficits in selected transition economies, in % of GDP, 2006
Source: EBRD (taken from QM no. 10, text Spotlight on 1, P. Sanfey, “Current account 
deficit in Serbia: Causes, Concerns and Consequences”, December 2007
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should repay the same level of debts in a longer term. However, as 
shown by Tables 1 and Table 5, Serbian foreign reserves exceed many 
times the amount of short-term debt (the situation is at least three 
times worse in all other countries observed), and foreign reserves are 
higher by as much as 25% than the sum of the short-term debt and 
total current account deficit. Therefore, this risk may not be consid-
ered significant in Serbia, although any further deceleration of foreign 
reserves growth would present a very serious signal of increase in vul-
nerability of the Serbian economy.13 
14. Most foreign direct investments in Serbia come through privati-
zation. The FDI level reached a record USD 5.5 billion during 2006, 
and then (for the first time) exceeded the amount of the current 
account deficit, but the situation may hardly be repeated in future 
years without an increase in the share of greenfield investments. The 
investment structure is also important – namely, whether these invest-
ments are directed to the tradables sector (where they increase pro-
ductivity and exports) or to the non-tradables sector. Although pro-
ductivity gains do happen in nontradables sector sector as well, no 
13 Foreign trade imbalance is still covered by external borrowing and foreign direct 
investments, so the NBS foreign reserves continued to increase. However, the 
increase in the NBS foreign reserves in 2007 was four times lower in the absolute 
amount than in 2006, which may indicate future problems in covering the current 
account deficit
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current foreign currency inflow is generated here, which may generate 
problems in the future. Experiences in transition countries show that 
investments in the nontradables, particularly in real property, often 
lead to credit expansion, increase in wages and prices of real property, 
which leads to further growth of this sector (the so-called Dutch dis-
ease). With a consequently increasing imports demand and decreas-
ing exports supply, the current account deteriorates inevitably. 
Table 7 
Share of foreign direct investments in the tradables sector
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Србија CEE Baltics
Tradables 22 46 36 42 42 20
Nontradables 78 54 64 58 58 80
Trade 13 15 8 14 14 14
Transport 26 12 16 7 7 9
Financial 
intermediation 20 11 28 18 18 27
Real property 9 6 2 11 11 15
Source: IMF WP/07/236 Vulnerabilities in Emerging Southeastern Europe—How Much 
Cause for Concern?
15. In analyzing the favorableness of foreign investment arrival – 
whether through privatization or as a greenfield investment – it must 
also be taken into account that, from the aspect of external vulnerabil-
ity, a large inflow of investments into the nontradables sector may be 
counterproductive in the long term, because it itself may cause an 
even larger increase in the deficit, although it will certainly be favor-
able in the short term. Examples of Ireland and Portugal are frequently 
mentioned in the literature, where Ireland, by attracting foreign invest-
ments into the tradables sector (electronics and medicines) increased 
significantly first the exports and productivity, while wages always 
lagged behind factor productivity growth. With a decrease in public 
spending, the investment expansion did not increase the balance of 
payments deficit – because the savings increased faster than invest-
ments, and even a current account surplus was recorded! In contrast 
to that experience, the large inflow of capital into Portugal went to the 
nontradables sector, mostly to real property. Since the wage growth 
exceeded factor productivity growth, the profit margin in the exports 
sector constantly decreased, and so did the exports sector. With an 
increasing fiscal deficit, the savings decreased, while the current 
account recorded an increasingly high deficit and at one moment 
became unbearably high, so its decrease had to be followed by reces-
sion. The experience of Portugal may be very indicative in analyzing 
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the vulnerability of the Serbian economy, which, like Portugal, con-
stantly pursues the policy of wage increase above TFP, does not reduce 
public spending, while foreign investments are directed primarily to 
the nontradables sector. 
16. The problem of external deficit vulnerabilities will certainly 
remain topical in Serbia in the following years as well. Among the key 
hard decisions is the reduction of public spending, i.e. ahceivement of 
fiscal surplus and attraction of greenfield investors in the tradables 
sector. The political instability, however, leads Serbia in a totally dif-
ferent direction, towards an increase in public spending and deficit, 
with an increasingly uncertain inflow of foreign investors. That would 
hamper the first recorded trends of increase in exports of machine-
building and electrical manufacturing industry, which are a result of 
greenfield investments, such as the Gorenje factory in Valjevo, as well 
as of earlier privatizations. At the same time, the investment environ-
ment itself, according to the report “Doing Business in Serbia”, ranks 
Serbia 68th among 175 countries in terms of business conditions, only 
two places below Hungary, but above Russia, Turkey, some EU coun-
tries, Poland, Italy and Greece, as well as Montenegro, Macedonia and 
B&H, which is certainly a result that would be considerably hampered 
by a longer political instability.
INFLATION AND ExCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION
17. Unlike most of the former socialist countries, Serbia did not 
manage to achieve a single-digit inflation rate even after eight 
years of transition. The largest contribution to that in the earlier 
periods was given by election campaigns, while the greatest barrier 
to inflation was the IMF arrangement, with constant insistence on 
greater restrictiveness of fiscal and monetary policy, which certainly 
contributed more moderate inflation trend then it otherwise would 
have been. 
18. Inflation in 2007 was double-digit (10.1%) and may be attributed 
to the increase in non-core inflation (electricity, utility services, tobacco 
products, oil products), exogenous shocks – the world trends of increase 
in the prices of food products and energy raw materials, but also to the 
increase in aggregate demand which accommodated these shocks. 
However, despite the double-digit total inflation, core inflation was 
5.4%, hence it remained within the planned range of 4–8%. Decelera-
tion of inflation was primarily caused by the active policy of the NBS 
aimed at the stabilization of nominal exchange rate, which was con-
ducted more or less successfully during the entire previous year. As a 
consequence of conducting this policy, the dinar became increasingly 
overvalued (paragraph 20).
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 19. Expenditure shocks were registered in the first five months of 
2008 as well – the increase in the prices of oil, electricity and food. How-
ever, the expenditure increase will not generate inflation if the demand 
remains inactive. As shown by the example of developed countries, the 
impact of expenditure shocks on inflation in the absence of demand 
increase is minimal. The very high demand increase at the end of 2007 
was caused by the high increase in public spending in the second half of 
the year as well as the significant credit expansion, which thus “feeds” 
inflation generated by the expenditure shocks described. 
The NBS tries to hold inflation by sharp increases in the reference 
rate from 10.75% in January to 15.75% in late May and reducing the 
money supply (M2) by 7.5% since the beginning of the year. Another 
mechanism remains for reducing the aggregate demand and that is pub-
lic spending reduction, which would partly hold credit expansion as 
well. This is in fact registered in the first months of 2008, when Serbia 
achieved a surplus in the fiscal account, but concerns remain that 2007 
may be repeated, when initial fiscal surplus in the first half of the year 
turned out to be a deficit by the end of the year.
20. Since food prices will certainly continue growing in 2008, and so 
will credit expansion, it is to be expected that inflation in Serbia will 
accelerate. However, the increase in food prices in Serbia certainly may 
not be justified by the increase in the world prices in this area, because 
the increase in food prices is several times lower in all other neighbor-
ing countries (except in Bulgaria). Therefore the causes of price increase 
in this area are primarily in the area of aggregate demand expansion, 
and the high level of prices of food products may primarily be explained 
by the existence of monopolies, especially in retail chains, which again 
shows that investments in retail trade in Serbia, although belonging to 
the nontradables sector and being a potential threat in terms of the bal-
ance of payments crisis, are very welcome because they may increase 
competition and lead to a decrease in retail prices to the level in the 
neighboring countries, where lower prices of food products than in Ser-
bia are constantly recorded. An additional danger is potential wage 
indexation to the accelerated increase in imported inflation. Since the 
NBS announced further reduction of inflation in 2008 (with a 3–6% 
core inflation), the NBS will most likely pursue a restrictive monetary 
policy, with further appreciation of the dinar. At the same time, one 
may not exclude new episodes of nominal appreciation, either, which is 
everything else but a useful move of the Serbian monetary authorities. 
At the same time, the statements regarding the “market-based fluctua-
tion of exchange rate” contradict sharply the NBS practice by which any 
exchange rate movement in undesirable direction (depreciation) was 
immediately interrupted in an efficient manner, with praise and self-
praise of the monetary authorities’ efficiency in these situations. 
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21. One of the important experiences of all successful transition 
economies is that acceleration of economic growth cannot be “bought” 
with high inflation. It was also confirmed that inflation curbing does 
not cause recession and that it is precisely the other way round. Numer-
ous researches confirm that the basic determinants of growth were the 
low inflation rate, public spending reduction and resolute implementa-
tion of institutional reforms. What may be a surprise is that the coun-
tries that realized better economic results in terms of growth and infla-
tion also record greater equality in distribution.14. It turns out that the 
sustainable economic growth is primarily based on macroeconomic sta-
bility, inflow of foreign investments and increase in domestic invest-
ments, rise in competition and exports and consequent (rather thab ex 
ante) increase in income and the standard of living. 
22. In mid-2006, as the framework for implementing the monetary 
policy, the National Bank of Serbia used the inflation targeting 
regime.15 In addition to the repo interest rate, which is the basic instru-
ment of this regime of monetary policy, the NBS also uses (1) the rate of 
required reserve and (2) interventions in the foreign exchange market.16 
Experiences of the other countries in transition that use inflation tar-
geting regime show that the strongest impact on inflation is made by 
the exchange rate channel,17 while the effect of the interest rate channel 
and the credit channel has not been empirically confirmed so far in Serbia 
(Fren QM11). The use of high rates of required reserve or macro-pru-
dential measures for the purpose of decelerating bank loans was often 
of short duration. This isbecause the high demand for loans found direct 
credit channels from abroad. Therefore it turns out that credit increase 
is determined primarily by the demand for loans, which is still high, 
while the room for influencing this increase with monetary policy is 
rather limited. In these conditions, expansionist fiscal policy may 
strongly hinder the monetary policy in its effort to keep the prices under 
control, which in the conditions in which the exchange rate presents the 
14 Compare Balcerowicz, WB (2003). In Poland, the Gini ratio increased from 28 to 
31, but in Russia the Gini ratio increased from 26 to 51, in Azerbaijan it rose from 
29 to 50 and in Ukraine from 24 to 46. Therefore there are grounds for saying that 
inequality increases faster when the reforms are absent than when they are imple-
mented in an accelerated manner. 
15 This regime was introduced by almost all transition countries in Europe. The central 
bank announces in advance the defined inflation target for the following period, 
while the key instrument of monetary policy is the reference (repo) interest rate.
16 Although the regime of free-floating exchange rate was introduced, the central 
bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market each time it estimates that the 
fluctuations threaten to endanger the financial stability of the market in the short 
term, because of which it may not be said that there is a free-floating exchange rate 
nor that there is a predominant role of market forces in exchange rate formation. 
17 Admittedly, the exchange rate may be influenced in the very short term by the 
repo rate level itself, because the banks will place the capital they import from 
abroad in the repo market whenever the return becomes attractive to them. The 
exchange rate changes are further transferred through the exchange rate channel 
to prices.
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key pillar of the monetary policy not only results in a more expensive 
monetary policy (expressed by high interest paid on the NBS repo oper-
ations), but also causes a high exchange rate appreciation in order to 
decrease the prices in the short term for the purposes of consistent real-
ization of the NBS target in terms of annual inflation. A strong appre-
ciation, which separates the real exchange rate from its fundamental 
determinants, decreases the competitiveness of the Serbian economy, 
discourages exports and causes an increase in the balance of payments 
current account deficit. 
 
23. Practically all relevant institutions estimated that the dinar is 
overvalued, which is the only logical outcome whith expansionist fiscal 
and moderately restrictive monetary policy. The estimates of overvalu-
ation of real effective exchange rate range in the interval from 5% to 
25%.18 However, since a significant part of the expenditure is indexed in 
foreign currency, a real depreciation would mean that expenditure not 
indexed in foreign currency must be considerably lower than the gen-
eral rate of inflation or, in other words, that they have to be frozen in 
nominal terms. That would mean a real decrease in that expenditure, 
with its largest items being net wages and pensions. Experience of the 
countries that successfully pursued the floating rate policy show pre-
cisely that: the increase in real wages in the entire period of intensified 
exchange rate depreciations was minimal or did not exist at all. It is not 
probable that there is any political will to start pursuing such a policy in 
a short-term period in Serbia, so a possible depreciation must be viewed 
in that light.
24. A depreciation would also significantly worsen the existing unfa-
vorable currency mismatch, i.e. it would significantly decrease the value 
of (dinar) assets and increase the value of (foreign-currency indexed) 
liabilities, whereby room would be created for a currency crisis (com-
pare IMF, 2007). Therefore, a sustainable solution for a reduction of 
currency overvaluation should rather be sought in the continuation of 
structural reforms, increasing the competitiveness of domestic economy 
(which is closely tied to FDI) and in a more restrictive fiscal policy, 
which would lead to the calming of the balance of payments deficit 
according to the mechanism described in Item 11. Otherwise, the dinar 
depreciation that would be accompanied by accommodation of aggre-
gate demand could easily cause currency crisis and thereby, in the short 
term, only worsen the economic environment instead of improving it. 
On the other hand, it should certainly also be emphasized that the pol-
icy of overvalued dinar not only harms present exporters but also des-
timulates the arrival the potential ones, thus endangering future exter-
nal liquidity, new jobs as well as future economic growth. 
18 IMF Country Report No. 08/54, Roundtable: Inflation Targeting, Dinar Appreciation 
and External Imbalance: 2006 and Prospects For 2007, Scientific Association of 
Economists and FREN,
27
HIGH REAL AND HIDDEN uNEMPLOYMENT AND wAGES
25. Although both GDP and industrial production are still far from 
the “golden” 1989, wages reached that level in 2007. With the help of 
abundant initial foreign grants as well as by the already mentioned pol-
icy of the dinar appreciation and subsidizing domestic aggregate 
demand, shortly after the start of the transition in Serbia the population 
became able to finance the minimal consumer basket with one average 
wage. In the entire period, the wages increased quickly in real terms, 
quadrupling in the period of seven years. 
 
26. With such a rapid increase in real wages, an inevitable trade-off 
emerged between wage rises and absence in new employment. How-
ever, the number of unemployed decreased partly due to better record 
keeping of the real number of employees. The official data (RSO and 
National Employment Service) show that there are 2,488.8 thousand 
employed persons and about 795 thousand unemployed. At the same 
time, the number of employed decreased slightly and the decrease is 
primarily recorded in the tradables sector, while the increase is rea-
corded in the service sector (commerce, financial intermediation, real 
property business, education and culture and health and social work). 
In trade, an increase in the number of employed persons was realized 
despite a slight deceleration of economic activity. 
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Figure 4 
Real and nominal foreign exchange rate 2000–2008 (growth=appreciation)
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Table 8 
Population of 15 years of age and over
Republic of 
Serbia  2000 2001  2002 2003  2004  2005 2006  2007
Unemployment 
rate – total  12.09  12.23  13.28  14.63  18.50  20.8  20.9  18.1
Unemployment 
rate (15–64 years 
of age) 
 13.26  13.36 14.47  16.00  19.53  21.83  21.56 18.8
Source: Labor force survey, Press Release no. 29 from 2008, RSO
The growth deceleration in employment and growth acceleration in 
vacant jobs indicate a gap between the number of vacant jobs and the 
number of new employment contracts. At the same time, a deceleration 
of the growth rate of employment termination was recorded. 
27. In addition to hindering the increase in new employment, the 
high wage increase significantly diverts investments to the nontradables 
sector and therefore presents a source of high vulnerability of the Ser-
bian economy in the medium term. The golden rule for is that the pro-
ductivity increase must cover the real wage increase as well as the cur-
rency appreciation, which regularly fails to happen in Serbia (compare 
Fren QM11). Therefore, the policy of financing the balance of payments 
deficit and filling the budget with privatization proceeds, coupled with 
further generous rises in wages and consequential crowding out invest-
ments from the tradables sector may indeed be called a policy of “selling 
the family silver”, which has never led to a creation of a sound and com-
petitive economic environment, so there is no reason to believe that it 
could even happen at all. 
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Figure 5 
wages in Serbia 1987–2007.
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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
28. Serbian economy has been recording positive growth rates in 
the entire period of transition. There are two reasons for which in 
the first four years Serbia did not experience the so-called transition 
recession, which was experienced twice by some countries (Bulgaria, 
Romania, the Czech Republic etc). The first reason lies in the drastic 
decrease in economic activity throughout the entire decade preceding 
the start, which already led to the closing of many unprofitable com-
panies. However, the second, decisive reason for avoiding transition 
recession lies in the active subsidizing of state-owned and socially-
owned companies. Owing to numerous structural reforms, the restruc-
tured banking sector, well selected privatization model and increas-
ingly fast arrival of foreign investments, the rates of growth are high. 
Owing to these reforms the corporate sector started to record aggre-
gate profit.
29. The population’s standard of living in the observed eight years 
of transition has improved significantly, GDP per capita increased 
from about USD 1000 to over USD 5600, not only owing to the weaken-
ing dollar. The Serbian economic policy seems to have adjusted the 
entire set of measures precisely to populist goals: (i) the overvalued 
exchange rate enabled higher imports of consumer goods and a higher 
standard of living, (ii) high public spending, which enabled to a great 
extent the wage increase to exceed by far the increase in labor produc-
tivity and (iii) delay in implementation of bankruptcy legislation enabled 
a number of unproductive jobs, at which unearned wages are received, 
to be kept. 
2007* 7,5% 2007 5641
2006 5,8% 2006 4207
2005 6,2% 2005 3526
2004 8,4% 2004 3285
2003 2,5% 2003 2720
2004 4,2% 2004 2112
*) Estimation 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia
Figure 6 
GDP Growth Rate GDP per capita in $
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30. In such conditions and primarily owing to the significant rise in 
wages and pensions as well as social transfers, poverty in Serbia was 
halved in the period from 2002 to 2007. According to the data of the 
2007 Survey of the Standard of Living, 6.6% of citizens in Serbia, or 
approximately 490 thousand, are poor. Perceived poverty decreased as 
well, in particularly among those who estimate their financial position 
as very poor (the share decreased from 23.5% in 2002 to 15.4% in 
2007). The poverty structure did not change substantially, so also 
today the poorest are the uneducated population and unemployed 
persons as well as the elderly and multimember households. Regional 
differences and rural-urban differences are very pronounced and do 
not decrease. Still the most vulnerable is the population of the rural 
area of Southeast Serbia (RSO, World Bank, DIFID Standard of Living 
Study Serbia 2002–2007) 
31. Due to political turbulence, the economic reforms were practi-
cally halted in the 2006–07 period, while the state-owned and social-
ly-owned companies still drain domestic savings and investments 
remain very low. In spite of that, the economy of Serbia recorded a 
very high GDP growth in 2007 (about 7.5%). In addition, this growth 
coincided with a fall in agricultural production. This increase was pri-
marily realized due to the rapidly increasing aggregate demand stimu-
lated by strong credit expansion as well as pre-election fiscal expan-
sion from the last quarter of 2006. Onse these expenditures for the 
National Investment Plan were included in the budget, it became obvi-
ous how expansionist the fiscal policy really was. With the absence of 
a serious fiscal reform, such an increase certainly may not be sustain-
able in a longer term. 
Wages Growth
Appreciation Growth
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Figure 7 
wages, productivity and dinar appreciation, 2001–2007
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32. Conclusion. Macroeconomic imbalances in the economy of 
Serbia threaten to hinder further accelerated economic growth. For 
the purpose of lessening the key vulnerabilities, it is therefore necessary 
to: (1) reduce public spending, especially current expenditure, which 
would make room for an increase in capital expenditure at the expense 
of subsidies and wage increases in the state sector, (2) privatize public 
companies and, wherever possible, stimulate new entries in order for 
the party-based management structure of these companies to be 
replaced with private owners, and for the competition to enable an 
increase in the quality of their products and services along with a price 
decrease, (3) continue attracting foreign direct investments to the trad-
ables sector, primarily by controlling wages in the state-owned sector, 
by avoiding any further appreciation of the dinar and by continuing the 
reforms that will increase the competitiveness of the economic environ-
ment in Serbia. In addition to reducing public spending, most of the 
conditions that should be met for the maintenance of macroeconomic 
stability are clearly in the area of microeconomy and reform of govern-
ment administration. 
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Real Sector
PRIVATIzATION OF SOCIALLY-OwNED COMPANIES
1. In the 2001–2007 period, , 1,632 companies were sold by tender 
and auction privatization, and a total of EUR 2.1 billion of proceeds 
were realized. In addition, EUR 1.2 billion of additional investments 
have been secured and EUR 276.7 million for social program. In 2007, 
299 companies were sold, for a total ofEUR 481.8 million and EUR 
134.2 million were provided for investments. Most of the privatized 
companies (112 or 49%) were from the manufacturing industry sec-
tor, whose sale brought 39.3% of proceeds and 54.7% of investments 
in 2007. 
2. In the 2002–2007 period, from the Share Fund portfolio, about 
1.220 blocks of shares were sold and proceeds of EUR 613 million were 
realized. In 2007, the Share Fund sold minority blocks of shares of 420 
companies and realized privatization proceeds of EUR 162.8 million. 
Minority blocks of shares of 348 companies were sold for the first time 
in the capital market.
3. Due to the privatization and new entries, there was a relatively sig-
nificant change in the employment structure:
4. It may be seen from the table that there was an increase in employ-
ment in the private sector by about 300 thousand people, with a decrease 
in employment in the non-private (socially-owned and state-owned) 
sector by about 750,000 people.
5. The conduct of privatization so far may be characterized as rela-
tively good, with no major scandals. The scandals that did occur in the 
previous period were mostly related to the enforcement of the old Priva-
tization Law or to the bankruptcy procedure.
6. The concept of privatization that was based on the sale of majority 
of shares of companies to strategic investors, with distribution of a 
smaller number of shares to the employees and with a mandatory 
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competitive method of sale proved to be very good. However, one of the 
shortcomings of the adopted model became apparent in Serbia as well 
– the model is very slow and demanding in administrative terms. Thus 
the deadline for privatization completion has been extended to the end 
of 2008. Such delay was also caused by the strategy of selling the best 
companies first and leaving the worst, the ones on the verge of bank-
ruptcy, for the end. 
RESTRuCTuRING
7. In parallel with the decision on the privatization model, a strategic 
decision was also made to leave the restructuring of the real sector 
mostly to private owners after the privatization. However, in a limited 
number of cases (about 80 companies) decision was made that the state 
should perform the pre-privatization restructuring. The mentioned 
restructuring, if a suitable solution is found for the companies’ debts, 
may perhaps be called a substitute for bankruptcy or for liquidation of 
the companies through bankruptcy.
8. The pre-privatization restructuring process may hardly be rated as 
good. Although it is evident that it is a very large economic and even 
political problem, one gets the impression that the entire process was 
conducted relatively poorly. In contrast to that, the post-privatization 
restructuring, the one conducted by new, private owners, led to favor-
able results in a great majority of cases, although it was inevitably 
accompanied by workforce layoffs or reduction of employment to the 
sustainable level. Today, such companies, together with green field for-
eign direct investments, are the drivers of the economic growth and 
exports of Serbia. 
9. It is certain that three main technical problems have arisen relat-
ing to carrying out the pre-privatization restructuring. The first is the 
problem of identification, separation and verification of the claims 
that various creditors have against the mentioned companies, since 
their due obligations have not been settled for years and even decades. 
That problem is intensified by the problem of debt towards the state 
for the write-off of which, whether conditional or unconditional, 
independently of the government policy, there were no legal grounds 
in certain situations. The second problem is the relatively complex 
and rather senseless organizational structure of these companies, pri-
marily the cases of socially-owned holding company created by a 
transformation of the so-called composite organizations of associated 
labor. This second problem was compounded by the engagement of 
foreign consultants, which was mandatory in some cases, where grants 
of large multilateral donors were used. The foreign consultants, unused 
to such organizational solutions, wasted time searching for sense 
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where there is none nor has there ever been. The third problem was 
the debt of those companies towards the government, which led to the 
negative value of capital and rendered privatization after restructuring 
impossible. As late as in mid-2005, legal grounds were created for a 
“release” of debts i.e. for payment to the state-owned creditors from 
privatization proceeds, which accelerated the restructuring and priva-
tization of these companies. 
10. However, the key reason for the absence of activity in the sphere 
of pre-privatization restructuring of this group of companies lies in 
the lack of political will to do it. The surplus labor in these companies 
presents the basic reason for the lack of that will. Namely, restructur-
ing of those companies would inevitably lead to a layoff of a large 
number of current employees, whether directly, during the pre-priva-
tization restructuring, or indirectly, after the privatization, as part of 
the new owner’s effort to restructure its own company and increase its 
economic efficiency. The total number of those that will lose their jobs 
in the restructured companies varies from one company to another, 
but it may generally be said that they are older employees, those hav-
ing lower skills and relatively low capacities to learn and change their 
working habits and for whom, because of that, it would be relatively 
hard to find a new employment.
BuSINESS ENVIRONMENT
11. In addition to the activities on the privatization of the socially-
owned sector, in the past eight years the Government also put a lot of 
effort into the improvement of general business environment, with 
the basic aim of attracting foreign direct investments but also with the 
aim of establishing new domestic companies, which were expected to 
employ all of those left jobless. In 2006, Serbia was even declared a 
leader in reforms. Unfortunately, the pace of reforms decreased in the 
following years.
In that regard, it is worth reviewing the findings of the “Doing Busi-
ness” report regularly published by the World Bank, in which the coun-
tries of the world are ranked according to various indicators (Table 2). 
12. It may be concluded that by far the greatest progress was achieved 
in obtaining loans and financing business activities. Serbia is ranked 
very poorly in the areas of judiciary (contract enforcement) and bureau-
cracy (obtaining permits, property registration), and the labor legisla-
tion is also very inflexible.
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Table 2 
Business enviroment
Category “Doing Business” ranking for Serbia in 2008
General ease of doing business index 86
Starting a business 90
Dealing with licenses 149
Employing workers 110
Registering property 115
Getting credit 13
Protecting workers 64
Paying taxes 121
Trading across borders 58
Enforcing contracts 101
Closing a business 103
CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS
13. The biggest problem related to the completion of privatization in 
Serbia is the fate of the companies that are still in the restructuring pro-
cedure. The key issue is the lack of political will to complete the privati-
zation, but one gets the impression that, even if the political will existed, 
the process of bankruptcy of these companies could last long. Namely, 
the administrative capacity for carrying out complex bankruptcies in 
Serbia still does not exist, although significant progress was made with 
the passing of the new Bankruptcy Law and initiation of licensing of 
bankruptcy administrators.
14. Also, in recent months it may be noticed that the government is 
inclined to consider alternative methods of privatization as well, such as 
the one planned for the Zastava Automobili company. Although a joint 
venture with a strategic investor may be a good option in a very limited 
number of cases, it should not be applied as a substitute for bankruptcy 
of collapsed firms or tender sale. 
15. One of the most valuable resources that is not privatized in Serbia 
and will probably be privatized in a relatively near future is urban land. 
The new Constitution, passed in 2006, enables private ownership over 
urban land, while the privatization procedure has not been defined yet. 
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Several dilemmas appear regarding this issue. The basic issue is the con-
nection between privatization and restitution. The existing Draft Dena-
tionalization Law provides for land restitution in kind to previous own-
ers while keeping the current owner’s ownership over the real property 
but not over the land. Such a solution is inadequate and may lead to big 
problems in the future. One gets the impression that, when it comes to 
urban land, financial compensation would be a better solution. 
16. Privatization of public companies is another big issue, but we 
mostly deal with it in the section on infrastructure. If we confine our-
selves to the public companies that are not involved in infrastructure 
and utility areas, we may identify several types of companies. The first 
type is represented by the public companies managing natural resources 
(the Srbijašume Forest Management Company and the Srbijavode Water 
Management Company, before all). The second type consists of the eco-
nomic entities organized as public companies but essentially perform-
ing functions of government authorities, such as the public companies 
for urban planning or so-called urban development agencies. Regard-
ing these companies, several options are possible. The first option is to 
reintegrate part of these companies in the government administration 
again, particularly those company parts essentially engaged in making 
regulations and to delegate parts of their activities to private companies 
wherever possible. The second option is for them to remain in the cur-
rent public company regime. 
17. As regards the business environment, the first and largest prob-
lem is related to acquiring land and obtaining construction/develop-
ment permits and licenses. The basic issue is urban land privatization, 
which has already been discussed. The second problem is the urban 
planning regime, which has not undergone sufficient reforms. Although 
the Law on Planning and Construction, passed in 2003, improved the 
situation to some extent, it is still rather poor. The manner of planning 
to service the land with utilities and its financing should be changed as 
well. The present system places the entire burden on the investor (which 
is good), but does not guarantee in any way that he would get what he 
paid for. It is also worth mentioning that, at the initiative of the interna-
tional community, environmental laws have been passed, which made 
obtaining the necessary construction permits considerably more diffi-
cult, particularly for manufacturing facilities. A special problem, based 
on the World Bank analysis, is a relatively poor situation regarding the 
flexibility of the Serbian labor market. The situation in this area deterio-
rated compared to the period 4–5 years ago, after the passing of the new 
Labor Law. With the formation of the new government, which, however 
formed, will insist on “social justice”, it is hard to expect significant 
progress in this area. Finally, a significant barrier to business is the unre-
formed and inefficient judiciary and low efficiency in terms of contract 
enforcement.
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BANkING
1. The banking system of Serbia, after the radical structural changes, 
is recovering rapidly. The credit supply increases, interest rates 
decrease, although the interest margins are still relatively high. In late 
2007 a total of 35 banks operated in Serbia with a total of 2,435 opera-
tional units (branches, sub-branches, counters as well as agencies and 
exchange offices) and a total of 30,246 employees. The sector owner-
ship structure is currently the following: the majority owners of 21 
banks are foreign shareholders, the majority owners of 6 banks are 
domestic natural and legal entities and the majority owner of 8 banks 
is the state. Five banks with the highest total assets at the end of 2007 
account for 45.9% of the total assets of the banking sector. The HH 
index of total asset concentration is 606 and exhibits an upward trend. 
The banks with foreign entities as majority owners account for 75.5% 
of the total assets, the banks with the state as majority owner account 
for 15.7% and the banks with predominantly private domestic owner-
ship account for 8.8%.
2. The increase of credit supply has been high during the entire 
period and has exhibited an accelerating trend during the last three 
years. For that reason, the Central Bank was forced to decelerate the 
bank credit activity, particularly towards the retail sector. The 
increase in loans for 2007 was RSD 215.4 billion or 39.5%. Corpo-
rate loans are still predominant (57.5% of the total loans). Retail 
loans, from nearly a zero share in 2001, reached 39.8% of the total 
loans in late 2007. During 2007, the total absolute increase in corpo-
rate loans (RSD 114.4 billion) became almost equal to the absolute 
increase in retail loans (RSD 106.7 billion). Therefore, the credit 
activity towards this sector was the most dynamic form of bank 
activity during the previous years. Admittedly, the balance sheet 
amounts of loans to companies underestimate their real level, 
because during the last two years a part of these loans were realized 
as the so-called cross-border loans that are not recorded in the bal-
ance sheet but as the off-balance sheet items.
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3. The total deposits in the banking sector increased rapidly as 
well. During the last two years, the predominance of foreign currency 
deposits in the total deposits has been decreasing gradually, and now 
they account for 64.2% of the total deposits. The maturity structure of 
deposits is still dominated by short-term deposits (53.3%) and demand 
deposits (42.0%). In the initial phase of recovery, the maturity structure 
of domestic savings was of a noticeably low quality, with the demand 
deposit share at the level of about 70%. This problem has been solved in 
two basic ways during the last three years: by importing foreign savings 
and by increasing interest rates on longer-term deposits. The first solu-
tion, which was predominant during 2005 and 2006 was discouraged by 
high required reserves on these types of sources. The second solution 
was used by banks, especially those that are not parts of large European 
bank holdings, during 2007. 
4. Increasing the size (of total assets) remains the first goal of the 
economic policy. This goal is achievable in the medium term because 
the banking sector of Serbia still has high growth potential. And this 
means that the present model of regulation should not be changed in 
conceptual terms but developed further. In order to maintain the 
dynamics of the banking sector recovery it is necessary to maintain a 
high dynamics of savings increase. The monetary stability remains the 
primary condition for achieving this goal, but also for further improve-
ment of competition in the deposit market. The second condition is 
an increase in the level of quality (maturity structure) and utilization 
of domestic savings. The central bank may, if the goals of sustaining 
the monetary stability allow it, gradually reduce the rate of required 
reserve on domestic savings. 
5. The second basic strategic goal is an increase in the banking sector 
efficiency and reduction of financial intermediation costs. The interme-
diation costs (net interest margin) of banks in Serbia are still high. Com-
petition increase in the banking sector is possible by a) developing reg-
ulatory framework for micro-financing and b) regulatory framework 
for mutual financing (savings banks, savings-loan cooperatives). 
6. It is desirable to formulate very soon a strategy of continuation 
of banking sector privatization, which should define in which banks 
the state will keep its ownership and in which not. A desirable solu-
tion is the privatization of small banks as quickly as possible and keep-
ing of state ownership in one or two banks. Another important issue is 
the privatization method. It is desirable to explore the possibility of 
applying the public offer (IPO) model in one of the two large state-
owned banks. It is also desirable to solve in a short time the problem 
of managing the assets of banks in bankruptcy and to focus the activ-
ity of the Deposit Insurance Agency on the basic area of deposit 
protection. 
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6. Increasing the safety level of the banking and financial system and 
reducing the level of its risk should enable its easier integration into the 
European processes and reduce the transfer costs. The supervision over 
operation of banks and other financial institutions should be further 
modernized in institutional and technical terms. The new secondary 
legislation, which comes into effect as of 1 July this year, fully imple-
ment the Basel I standards. The next step is the preparation and imple-
mentation of the Basel II standards. It is desirable for the central bank to 
prepare and publish, as soon as the conditions are created for this, a 
plan of implementation of the Basel II standards.
7. Taking into account the extent of interconnection of banks, insur-
ance companies and brokers, the experiences of some EU countries that 
have a single institution for the supervision over all financial activities 
should be considered. 
FINANCIAL MARkETS
8. The basic assets traded in the financial market of Serbia during 
the last six years are mostly the shares issued in the privatization 
procedure under the 1997 Law and, to a lesser extent, the bonds of 
the Republic of Serbia issued for the purpose of settling foreign cur-
rency savings deposits. The total, especially liquid, market capitaliza-
tion fluctuated wildly. During the last three years, the trends of own-
ership concentration and market emptying on the supply side have 
been observed. The number of shares traded decreased due to the 
concentration and withdrawal of blue-chip shares from the trading. 
The growing demand was concentrated on a relatively small number 
of securities. During 2006 and 2007, an upward trend was observed in 
the volume of trading, especially in the continuous trading segment. 
This process was a consequence of the entry, on the demand side, of a 
large number of individual investors and activation of additional 
sources of institutional demand (investment and pension funds). The 
process of market emptying decelerated, but did not stop. The two 
formal listings of the Belgrade Stock Exchange (A and B) were empty 
for years. Currently, three shares are on Listing A, while Listing B is 
empty. All other shares traded on the Stock Exchange are listed on the 
so-called free stock exchange market. Shares of as few as some one 
hundred companies are actively traded, while there was no trading in 
shares of about 1.200 listed companies in the observed period. The 
free stock exchange market is regulated by the Stock Exchange inter-
nal rules and observed in strictly formal and legal terms, the compa-
nies on that market are not public joint stock companies. 
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9. Since its origination until today, the financial market has predomi-
nantly been a mechanism of ownership right redistribution and to a 
lesser or almost negligible extent a mechanism of financing the cor-
porate sector and public sector. The basic (strategic) goal of financial 
market development is its preparation for that basic function. It is pos-
sible to do this with a fundamental reform of the regulatory framework 
that would enable the issuance of securities of corporate and public sec-
tor. Within this reform, it is necessary to a) revise the basic laws on 
securities (IPO procedure, authority of the regulatory body, protection 
of investors and market integrity), b) harmonize them with the legisla-
tion on economic associations (company opening and closing, public 
offer of securities) and c) improve the secondary regulations and effi-
ciency of the regulatory body (procedure of protection against price 
manipulation, budget and tariffs). 
10. In addition to the Law on the Market of Securities and Other 
Financial Instruments, which is partly harmonized with some EU direc-
tives, it is necessary to reconstruct radically the Takeover Law, which, 
in its current version, practically suspends competition in the takeover 
market. The basic direction of the law revision should be harmoniza-
tion with the EU standards. Significant issues that present an integral 
part of the regulation of this area in the EU are not covered by this law 
or are insufficiently regulated (public offer announcement, binding 
public offer, competitive public offer). Some solutions are vague so their 
application is almost rendered impossible (competitive public offer, 
supervision). Some these solutions are included in the existing draft 
amendments to the Securities Law, which were prepared by the Minis-
try of Finance.
11. In parallel with risk reduction, which would be achieved through 
a revision of basic laws, a reduction of expenses accompanying the issu-
ance of new instruments is possible in a short time. These fiscal and 
regulatory expenses (fees of the Securities Commission, the Central 
Registry and other related institutions) increase the expenses of issuing 
securities from both the corporate and the public sector. Along with 
new regulations, these measures should encourage the issuance of new 
securities, which would lead to the expansion and deepening of the 
market. Otherwise, the activation of new sources of demand in the 
financial market from the sector of investment and pension funds could 
lead to an appearance of an accelerated increase and an equally fast 
decrease in the value of indices, such as the one registered during 2007. 
12. In addition to a revision of basic laws, a special law on mortgage 
securities or on securitization is necessary as well. Issuance of low-risk 
mortgage-based securities would be enabled by this law.
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13. Strengthening the regulatory and supervisory function in the 
financial markets may also be considered a strategically important goal. 
It is necessary to redefine the authority of the regulatory body and 
increase its real capacity of regulation and supervision by defining its 
status as a clearly and practically independent regulatory body, from the 
Government as well as from market participants. It is possible to achieve 
these goals either by strengthening the existing institution (the Securi-
ties Commission) or by forming a new institution for supervision over 
all financial activities (banking, insurance, funds, financial market 
(integrated supervision concept), while taking into account the experi-
ences of other countries. An important goal is also the strengthening of 
the self-regulatory bodies and professional associations that enable an 
increase in the market discipline and improvement of ethical standards 
of professions, increase in the level of professional knowledge and skills 
and creation of confidence of the investment community and general 
public in the institutions.
INSuRANCE
14. The insurance activity is underdeveloped compared to most 
European countries. Such an estimate refers particularly to the life 
insurance area. The premium per capita (so-called insurance density) is 
close to the European minimum. The insurance sector restructuring 
started in June 2004 with the implementation of the new legal authority 
of the NBS in this activity (the functions of supervision, normative reg-
ulation of business operations, issuance of business licenses and other 
forms of supervision). Separation of life and non-life insurance activi-
ties, as well as a strict separation of insurance from reinsurance were 
made by legal regulations. Also, the cash capital threshold by insurance 
type was increased significantly and free entry of foreign investors was 
enabled. Since June 2004, the number of insurance companies has been 
halved, while the number of reinsurance companies has remained the 
same. Two insurance companies dominate the insurance market. The 
majority share of one of them is socially-owned. The other companies 
are privately-owned. 
15. The regulatory reform essentially normalized the property insur-
ance as a traditional form of insurance in Serbia. The remaining activi-
ties in this area involve the regulation of the area of TPL and secondary 
regulations relating to the implementation of basic legislation: the Insur-
ance Law, the Law amending the Law on the National Bank of Serbia, 
the Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks and Insurance Com-
panies and other relevant legal regulations. Particularly urgent are the 
problems related to the obligations of insurance companies in which 
bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated and the problem of the 
guarantee fund. 
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16. The inherited duopolistic market structure will be maintained in 
the circumstances when the second largest insurance company has been 
privatized. Because of that, it is important to define, in a short time, a 
strategy of privatizing the first insurance company. The process of 
restructuring this company is under way and the selection of privatiza-
tion method to be applied depends on its results. If there is a high prob-
ability that the company value will increase, it is desirable to apply the 
initial public offer (IPO) method. However, if it turns out that the com-
pany’s value will decrease, the solution of one-time privatization by 
public tender method is recommendable.
17. Enforcement of the Decision on the Manner of Protecting the 
Rights and Interests of Policy Holders, Insurance Beneficiaries and 
Third Parties has a special importance for gaining confidence and for 
the development of domestic insurance. 
18. Stimulating fiscal policy measures in the area of personal income 
taxation that may accelerate the development of voluntary pension insur-
ance are desirable. In addition to tax incentives, it is desirable also to cre-
ate other incentives for the development of life insurance services. 
19. Depending on the basic strategy of further development of supervi-
sion, a strategy of insurance supervision should be formulated as well. If 
the solution of integrated supervision is not accepted, it is desirable to 
form a separate insurance regulatory body within the National Bank of 
Serbia. If the idea of integrated supervision is accepted, a process should 
be initiated of gradual unification and integration of insurance supervi-
sion into a single institution for the supervision of the non-banking finan-
cial sector and then the financial sector as a whole within the NBS.
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Agriculture
1. In Serbia, agriculture is not considered an ordinary industry, pri-
marily due to the specific character of this production, as well as due to 
the tradition and great expectations associated with it. In all municipal 
and regional strategies, agriculture is recognized as one of the basic 
strategic directions of development, and a large part of the population, 
rural as well as urban, sees the greatest developmental opportunity of 
Serbia in it. Agriculture is indeed an industry that may produce more 
wealth than it does now and thus contribute to the development of the 
country. It may also present a short-term buffer for facilitating transi-
tion processes, but it may not continue to employ the number of people 
currently employed in it and be competitive in the region Serbia strives 
to join through integration processes. The conflict of the role of agricul-
ture in the economic development and its social component is what 
characterized the past period. Changes in the agriculture are happen-
ing, albeit slowly, and rather as a response to the market processes and 
not as a clear Government strategy for sector development, while the 
institutional and legislative reforms have been initiated but not com-
pleted. Several clear characteristics and trends may be observed in the 
previous eight years: 
2. Change in ownership structure and land consolidation. Although 
the privatization of the whole sector is not complete, because a certain 
number of agro-industrial complexes have not been privatized yet and 
most of the “old cooperatives” do not have a resolved status but still 
operate according to the principles of socially-owned capital in which 
the employees manage the cooperative, it may be said that this process 
is nevertheless being brought to an end. It was determined by the Law 
on Agricultural Land that privatization of the state-owned land should 
wait for restitution and that, in the meantime, the land should be leased 
through auction to the highest bidder. Unlike previously , this time the 
lessee pays a rent, and a novelty is that the lessee may be a natural per-
son as well. Also, the Law left to the municipalities to prepare a program 
of use of state-owned land as well as to organize auctions. Unfortunately, 
in many cases the municipalities had neither the capacity nor the will to 
implement the legal solution, nor did the Ministry of Agriculture, as the 
institution in charge of the management of state-owned land, observe 
the Law regarding the assumption of a more active role in cases when 
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the municipalities fail to observe the Law. Nevertheless, the implemen-
tation of the Privatization Law and the Law on Agricultural Land, 
although accompanied by big problems, has now led to a situation that 
a large part of the land and resources is used by private producers that 
are capable of making larger profit. 
3. Instability of agrarian policy. Three phases may be identified in 
the agrarian policy in the past eight years. The first (2001–2003), ori-
ented towards price support for certain crops (soybean, sunflower, sugar 
beet, wheat) and absence of other agricultural policy measures, the sec-
ond (2004–2006), in which price supports were abolished and there was 
a shift to support of investments and rural development, and the third 
(2007–2008), characterized by the establishment of payment per area 
and head of cattle and adoption of numerous ad hoc non-market mea-
sures. Such unpredictability of the policy reduced the possibility of 
long-term planning that resulted in an investment decrease in the sec-
tor and non-market transfer of profit between the participants in the 
market chain. 
4. Slow adjustment to food safety standards. Failure to adopt the 
Food Safety Law and a number of accompanying laws as well as a failure 
to establish efficient institutions for their enforcement is one of the 
greatest failures of the agriculture policy makers in the previous period. 
The expensive and inefficient system is maintained because of the lack 
of readiness of the governmental institutions for reform in this sector, 
which presents one of the most significant problems in the integration 
into the EU and the WTO and may decelerate these processes to a large 
extent.
 
5. Slow development of support institutions and legislative frame-
work. The Republic Commodity Reserves Directorate has not yet been 
reformed and the Advisory Service and water management organiza-
tions still operate as socially-owned companies. Also, the unestablished 
National Laboratory as well as the unimplemented reform of scientific 
institutions for agriculture support are some of the unfinished tasks in 
establishing the institutional framework for agriculture development. 
Also, cooperative unions, the Chamber of Commerce and professional 
organizations present big obstacles to reforms in the sector. On the 
other hand, several significant institutions were established in this 
period, such as: administrations for veterinary medicine, plant protec-
tion, water management and forest management, farm registry and the 
Secretariat of Agriculture of the Province of Vojvodina. Also, several 
important laws have been adopted, such as the Law on Agricultural 
Land, Law on Forest Management and Law on Plant Protection, which 
provided the basis for the implementation of reforms.
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6. Initiated development of loan market and land market. Success-
ful agricultural sector is unimaginable without a developed credit mar-
ket and land market. The reform of the banking sector, establishment of 
the registry of farmers with an obligation to open bank accounts, the 
Ministry’s measures for promoting the credit market development and 
similar contributed to a decrease in specific risks related to farmer lend-
ing. Owing to this, the banks are increasingly willing to lend to farmers, 
which opens a possibility for the development of the land market, lease 
market as well as the sales market. Trade through barter arrangements 
in which the interest is presented in a very nontransparent manner have 
decreased as well. 
7. Decrease in the agriculture share in GDP. The constant trend of 
decrease in the agriculture share in GDP is not caused by a decrease in 
the value of agricultural production (VAP) but by the development of 
other sectors. Thus in 2001 the total VAP was RSD 135.08 billion (in 
constant prices of 2002) which accounted for 15.7% share in GDP, while 
in 2006 a VAP of RSD 137.8 billion was recorded, which accounted for 
10.7% of GDP. 
8. Significant increase in the exports value. The opening of the EU 
market for agricultural-food products from Serbia (Autonomous Trade 
Preferences from 2000) but also the whole networks of bilateral trade 
agreements with the neighboring countries (now enshrined in the 
CEFTA Agreement) created conditions for a transformation of Serbia 
into a net food exporter. It became this for the first time in 2005, with a 
surplus of about USD 255 million. High domestic protection, reestab-
lishment of severed trade connections, exports subsidies, but also 
numerous comparative advantages, lead to a further increase in the for-
eign trade deficit in this area, which was over USD 600 million in 2007.
9. Gradual market opening. Despite the liberalization in 2001, the 
agriculture of Serbia still has the highest tariff protection in the region 
(the average tariff equivalent is about 21%). By negotiations within the 
WTO and the SAA, this level of protection will be reduced in phases 
(the SAA within 6 years to the level of 3.1% of the average tariff equiva-
lent). However, almost a whole decade with a high protection, which is 
primarily a result of active lobbying, has made it impossible to perceive 
fully the competitiveness levels of domestic products. 
10. undeveloped modern market chains operating in legal area. 
There are two basic challenges in establishing market chains. The first 
challenge is – how to include small producers in a modern market 
chain because they are uncompetitive to a large extent, they operate 
through informal channels and their cost of complying with standards 
is high. The second – how to increase the competitiveness at the level 
of manufacturing capacities that will be able to increase spending 
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through finding new markets. A high competition at the level of pri-
mary production and a low level of competition at the level of manu-
facturing are obvious, which is primarily caused by low attractiveness 
of the area for investment due to non-compliance with the EU exports 
standards for a large group of products, by unpredictability of the sup-
port policy, underdevelopment of institutions, absence of knowledge 
of real competitiveness due to high tariff protection and similar. 
11. The agriculture policy makers face numerous challenges that 
should be solved. The restructuring may be delayed. However, the lon-
ger the delay, the lower the foreign investments, and a higher economic 
cost of resisting is unavoidable. The most important activities that 
should be undertaken may be classified into several groups: 
12. Completion of transition processes of social ownership to pri-
vate or state ownership. Completion of privatization of socially-owned 
capital in the agriculture and passing the Law on Agricultural Coopera-
tives, which is expected to solve the issue of property and management 
of “old cooperatives”, will enable the allocation of resources to those that 
will be interested in investing in the improvement of agricultural pro-
duction. At the same time, it is necessary to return the agricultural land, 
as one of the greatest resources owned by the state, to its owners through 
the restitution process, and allocate the remaining state-owned land to 
those who are able to get the highest yield from it. Until the restitution 
process is completed, the land should be leased by means of auctions to 
the highest bidders, and in later stages sold by auction while observing 
the pre-emption rights of lease/sale defined by applicable Law on Agri-
cultural Land (the right of paying the highest bid for: owners of irriga-
tion systems and perennial plants on the auctioned land, owners of bor-
dering plots and registered farmers). 
13. Creation of agrarian policy directed towards market develop-
ment, competitiveness increase and food safety. The key precondition 
of agriculture improvement must be the implementation of a consistent 
and predictable agrarian policy defined by adopted strategic documents. 
By passing the Law on Agriculture and Rural Development the forms of 
support to agriculture should be further specified, but the beneficiaries 
of particular measures should be precisely defined as well. The coun-
try’s agricultural policy should have as its basic goal the improvement of 
production competitiveness, food safety and increasing the share of the 
funds intended for rural development in the agrarian budget. This 
means that the funds of the agriculture budget should be used for sup-
port to investments in equipment as well as in knowledge, and for build-
ing the rural infrastructure for the purpose of improving competitive-
ness but also developing rural areas into environments attractive for 
living and work. The legislative activity should be directed towards 
achieving compatibility with the EU’s acquis communautaire, the SPS 
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and TBT agreements within the WTO but also to creating conditions 
for institutional changes in the domestic agro-economic system for the 
purpose of its successful integration into the EU (CAP). In that regard, 
it is necessary to pass as soon as possible the Law on Food Safety, which 
will ensure, with as low expenses as possible, that the food produced in 
Serbia will meet the consumer needs in terms of safety and quality. 
Liberalization of the closed domestic market will enable the market 
allocation of land and other resources and thereby improve competi-
tiveness and provide investments. Taking into account the limitation of 
the domestic market in terms of area and purchasing power, the driver 
of development should be an increase in demand through an increase 
in exports, but stimulated by an improvement of competitiveness and 
by measures in accordance with the WTO principles. In addition to the 
traditional exported products (fruit, vegetables, sugar...), the potential 
lies in organic and integral products as well as the products of protected 
geographical origin, with a condition of previous legal regulation of 
these productions (although there are laws defining these areas, it is 
necessary to improve them).
Development of the financial market and rural loan market as well as 
building of a functional land market (as regards purchase as well as leas-
ing) must be the basis of agriculture development, so it is necessary for 
the state to address all obstacles on that path (title over land, contract 
observance, building the agricultural insurance system, building the 
system of warehouse receipts etc.). Improvement of the existing market 
information system in agriculture (STIPS), which will provide produc-
ers with timely information about prices and trends in the domestic and 
international market, should enable development of market chains in 
agriculture. Association of farmers is the best way of protecting com-
mon interests on the both sides of the market, so incentives to associa-
tions, cooperatives, chambers and other forms of association should be 
provided by creating a legal framework but also by financial incentives 
for collective activities. Although the agricultural policy should not be 
socially but developmentally oriented, it is necessary to recognize the 
vulnerable groups of farmers who, with their physical abilities or because 
they work in the areas less suitable for agricultural production, cannot 
be competitive and enable them, through the agrarian policy measures, 
to contribute to the rural development.
14. Development of support institutions. It is necessary to acceler-
ate the initiated reform of institutions, because the upcoming challenges 
of joining the EU and the possibility of using the EU funds intended for 
rural development require new and/or much more efficient institutions. 
At the same time, the increasingly high demands for food safety from 
domestic producers as well as in exports require the institutions that 
will be able to guarantee that in an efficient manner. Also, the farmers 
need for their development the institutions that are capable of making, 
implementing and controlling the policy in an efficient manner. The 
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primary goal should be the strengthening of capacities of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management itself, but also separat-
ing its certain functions and delegating them to independent bodies (for 
example, transformation and strengthening of the Department for 
Agrarian Implementation into an independent Payment Agency for the 
purpose of receiving the EU funds intended for agriculture and trans-
ferring them to the end users). The newly established Agency should 
also assume the function of the stabilizer of agricultural market from 
the Commodity Reserves Directorate, which should be reformed in the 
direction of replenishing the food stockpiles in case of emergency, as 
well as by introducing transparency in the work. Implementation of the 
EU-compatible agrarian policy will be facilitated by introducing spe-
cific administrative systems (Land Parcel Identification System – LPIS 
and Integrated Agricultural Control System – IACS). Food safety must 
be supported by establishing and putting into operation the National 
Food Control Laboratory. 
It is necessary for the agricultural technical service to undergo own-
ership transformation through the abolishment of the current social 
ownership and making its management possible to those that will be 
interested in its development. In the coming period, in addition to its 
existing functions, it will get several new functions, such as implemen-
tation of the system of economic-accounting indicators of agricultural 
production according to the EU model (Farm Accountancy Data Net-
work), preparation of business plans for IPA funds and similar. Already 
now the technical service does not meet the existing tasks, and it will 
not be able to meet new challenges without a serious reform of its 
functioning.
A special area of work should be the reform of education and scien-
tific institutions in agriculture, with an emphasis on the EU CAP, farm 
management, modern techniques of food production, manufacturing 
and sales, market trends in agriculture, “new” aspects of agriculture 
(rural development, multifunctionality, environment...). However, 
before that it is necessary to solve the status of the science institutes 
that are scientific institutes by their legal status and seed production 
companies by their function. For that reason it is necessary to form 
one state scientific institute and privatize the others.
53
Infrastructure
ENERGY
1. Since 2000, the electric power system of Serbia has undergone a 
thorough rehabilitation and revitalization of almost all existing pro-
duction and transmission facilities. Most of the investments based on 
which the rehabilitation was conducted were financed by donor funds. 
Also, there was a radical change in the price policy, so the electricity 
price was increased several times and a block tariff was introduced, 
which led to positive effects on electricity demand management. 
Introduction of regional electricity market was initiated in order to 
promote the trade between the electric power industries in the area of 
Southeast Europe. 
 
2. The attained price of electricity is already rather high so the issue 
of further price policy arises. Namely, although there is still a lag behind 
the prices in some neighboring countries, if the electric power industry 
cannot cover its average expenses with such price, then it is obvious that 
it is a matter of low production efficiency. The new price increase, which 
is constantly considered in order to cover the average expenses, does 
not present by any means an incentive for their control or reduction. In 
that regard, an urgent introduction of economic regulation that is based 
on incentives (RPI-X type) should be considered, in order to create 
incentives for the control or reduction of operating expenses of electric 
power companies. 
3. A process of vertical separation of the electric power system was 
started by forming a separate public company for electricity transmis-
sion, while the production and distribution of electricity was allocated 
to the Elektroprivreda Srbije Public Company, which has eleven sub-
sidiaries within it. The production company includes all production 
facilities including the coal strip mines that supply the power plants. 
The mentioned companies still include a large number of non-core 
activities, so they are characterized by inefficiency in the performance 
of the core activity and a rather large surplus labor, which affects the 
average expenses. 
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4. There are no clear plans for privatization of the electric power 
system from the aspect of privatization scope (what will be privatized) 
as well as from the aspect of privatization method and dynamics (how 
and when it will be privatized) and also an appropriate pre-privatiza-
tion restructuring. The idea of free distribution of shares of public 
companies that appeared during last year is not explained nor devel-
oped in detail.
5. The rehabilitation of the electric power system led to an increase 
in its effective capacity, but the increase in demand caused by eco-
nomic recovery and economic growth during the last decade led to 
the lack of available capacity. Therefore, a question arises of the need 
for building new production capacities (in the light of the question: 
own production or supply from abroad), primarily of the “Kolubara 
B” power plant, but also the TENT 3 capacities, or a question of the 
manner of financing such an investment. The answer to this question 
inevitably has implications on the organizational and management 
structure of the electric power system. If such an investment were 
financed by loans that would burden the public company, nothing 
would change in the existing organization of the electric power sys-
tem. If a concession were granted, and then this concession were 
financed by private capital of concessionaries, a horizontal separation 
of production would thus be de facto started and a question would 
arise of a single (uniform) price of electricity on the threshold of trans-
mission, i.e. the price at which electricity is sold to the electricity 
transmission company. 
6. Underground coal mines have been spun off into a separate pub-
lic company. Taking into account the quality of supplied coal as well as 
the high expenses of mining it, the imported coal presents a more eco-
nomic option to the consumers, so it may not be expected that this 
company will be sustainable such as it is in this moment. It is probable 
that the only reasonable option is the privatization of this company 
(the strategy exists, the Government adopted it in 2007). The private 
owner will be in the position to restructure this industry radically, 
which probably implies a closure of certain coal mines and an alterna-
tive use of their assets. 
7. The oil industry is still a vertically integrated monopoly (NIS), 
which combines the production (exploitation of its own deposits) of 
crude oil, its refining and production of oil products, as well as the dis-
tribution network and retail sale of oil products. By the Regulation of 
the Government of Serbia, the importation of oil products has been 
prohibited ever since 2001, so the whole supply of fuel is based on the 
crude oil refined in the NIS refineries (the exception are those oil prod-
ucts that cannot be produced in the mentioned refineries for technical 
reasons). There is no monopoly in the oil retail trade, since there is a 
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large number of companies (some of them foreign owned) that are 
involved in this activity, but all of them have to buy the oil products 
solely from the NIS. 
8. The price of oil products is regulated directly by the executive 
power (the Government of Serbia, or the Ministry of Mining and 
Energy) on the basis of average price of crude oil. The average price of 
crude oil is in fact the only variable in forming the price, since all of 
the other price components are fixed and expressed in a physical unit 
of measure (barrel or ton) including also the refining expenses and 
importation expenses. Further, the trade margin is limited and this 
limitation is specified according to the physical unit of measure. Since 
all of the mentioned parameters are defined by the Government Regu-
lation, they may be changed by changing the regulation as well, which 
leads to uncertainty regarding the business conditions for all players 
in the oil product retail market, while the NIS may rely on the transfer 
of possible increase in its expenses to consumers by exerting pressure 
on the Government, which means that it has no incentive for expense 
control. The increase in the prices of crude oil also raises a question of 
excise duty policy, or whether the whole increase in the prices of crude 
oil should be transferred to consumers, although no public discussion 
has taken place about this so far. 
9. In early 2008, a comprehensive intergovernmental agreement was 
concluded between Serbia and Russia by which NIS, with the existing 
industry structure, will be sold to the Russian state company Gaz-
promneft. The selling price was EUR 400 million, while the agreement 
stipulates that the buyer should invest another EUR 500 million dur-
ing the following five years. The Agreement conditions were not 
obtained in a transparent manner, for example through an auction or 
tender, and it is a framework agreement that does not define all details 
of this transaction. It may be estimated that this agreement also had a 
significant foreign policy component relating to Russian support to 
Serbia regarding Kosovo. The Agreement has not been ratified yet by 
the National Assembly.
10. Gas supply, except for low-pressure gas distribution that 
belongs to utility activities, is within the competence of the Srbijagas 
Public Company. In technical terms, the biggest problem of gas sup-
ply is the regularity of supply, which may be solved by completing 
the construction and putting into operation the gas storage facility 
Banatski Dvor. 
11. Further prospects of the gas supply activity depend on the South 
Stream project and its implementation. Although the intergovernmen-
tal agreement was signed, there are still many uncertainties in this area. 
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12. The Energy Agency of the Republic of Serbia is an independent 
regulatory body established in 2005 with extensive authority in the 
whole energy sector (electric power industry, oil industry, gas and dis-
trict heating). A certain part of that authority (price control, for exam-
ple) is not exercised because the Government still makes decisions on 
the price of oil products and the price of electricity. The Government 
does it on the ad hoc basis, taking into account the elements that are not 
of priority to the energy sector (political elements, macroeconomic sta-
bility etc.), so the regulatory risk the companies face in this industry 
increases significantly. At the same time, it turned out that the risk is 
not distributed equally and that it may be expected that big public com-
panies will have an opportunity to transfer the regulatory risk to other 
participants in the market. 
TRANSPORT
13. The road network and road transport, starting from 2001, has 
seen great endeavors in the sphere of rehabilitation of the road network, 
which was heavily damaged by inappropriate maintenance during the 
1990s. A certain part of the rehabilitation was financed by grants, but a 
larger part was financed by international loans.
14. The financing system has been changed several times, and cur-
rent system is based on the principle that 10% of the excise duty on liq-
uid fuel goes to road maintenance, while the whole amount of the road 
maintenance tax that is paid upon vehicle registration and that equals 
the total amount of toll is allocated to this purpose. The funds flow into 
the public road maintenance company Putevi Srbije, which is responsi-
ble for the maintenance, development and management of Class I and 
Class II roads. 
15. The amount of the part of liquid fuel excise duty that should be 
directed to road industry is a controversial issue, which indeed was the 
subject of political debates and even conflicts during the previous 
period. Another open issue is the question whether the financing of 
road industry should be performed through the “road fund” completely 
independently of the budget or the transfers should go through the bud-
get. Furthermore, a question may also be asked whether the motorway 
toll proceeds should be used for the purposes of the whole road net-
work (the existing solution) or whether they should be directed solely 
to the maintenance of the existing motorways and construction of new 
ones. Finally, another open question is the one of transparency and effi-
ciency of operation of the Putevi Srbije public company, as well as the 
process of deciding on priorities regarding the construction, rehabilita-
tion and maintenance of the road network. 
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16. The Government of Serbia made a decision to engage private cap-
ital through the concession for construction of the Horgoš-Požega 
motorway. It was decided also to give over the sections already con-
structed (the motorway and the semimotorway) to the future conces-
sionary for operation, which it could operate (charge toll) during the 
construction of the missing sections. The available results of the traffic 
frequency research show that a certain number of sections south of Bel-
grade do not have a traffic frequency that justifies the motorway exis-
tence. Numerous weaknesses in the procedure of concession announce-
ment, specification of its conditions and selection of concessionary were 
observed, and then problems also appeared in the conclusion of the 
concession agreement. Finally, the concessionary failed to fulfill the 
contractual obligations in terms of delivering a bank guarantee, so by 
the Government decision it was not allowed to enter into the transac-
tion and start the road construction. The fate of this concession remains 
unclear but already the experience so far is sufficient for amending the 
concession regulations, whose weaknesses led to the mentioned prob-
lems in the first place. 
17. The railway transport in Serbia is performed within the monop-
oly of the Železnice Srbije Public Company. This company is the largest 
individual beneficiary of subsidies from the budget of Serbia and in 
2007 they were about EUR 120 million. Even with such subsidies, the 
company records losses due to high unit costs as well as due to insuffi-
cient demand for transportation services.
18. A large part of domestic freight transport is now directed to 
road transport or truck transport including also the transport for own 
purposes, which is far faster, more efficient and more flexible, espe-
cially taking into account the increased demands for quality transport 
services. Furthermore, observed in geographic terms, Serbia is a small 
country with a small average length of transport, which certainly does 
not favor railway transport, so the high share of transit (about 50% 
measured by ton-kilometers) in the total volume of railway operation 
is not surprising. Over 50% of the total quantity of transported goods 
without transit is accounted for by only one user (USS Serbia, Smeder-
evo) and it is very likely that, when institutional conditions are cre-
ated, this operator will be able to form its own company or a company 
under its own control. Similar arrangements may be expected in the 
case of transit as well. 
19. The passenger railway transport faces high demand elasticity, 
since the competition by the road transport is extremely high. In the 
given conditions, it is very likely that the passenger transport may not 
be expected to be profitable. 
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20. The first step towards the separation of transport activity from 
the railway infrastructure was made, but there was a slowdown in the 
application of this concept, since there is a lack of all those secondary 
regulations that would enable the real separation and introduction of 
competition or more operators in the freight transport. The regulatory 
function in this area is still completely in the hands of the Ministry. 
21. The flag carrier is organized as a public company and it is still 
not adjusted to the new situation resulting from the disappearance of 
the market of former SFRY. Such an adjustment may not be expected 
before the privatization, which had been postponed for a long time 
and finally announced for 2008. In the preparation for privatization, 
the maintenance sector was spun off and it should be privatized in a 
separate procedure, in all likelihood simultaneously with the airline 
company.
22. The Belgrade Airport is organized as a public company. It pro-
vides services to all interested companies, although the flag carrier 
enjoys a privileged status in terms of service price and payment terms. It 
remains unclear whether, when and how it will be privatized. 
23. The competent ministry deals with the regulation of the air trans-
port activity and practically has a discretionary right to grant individual 
transport licenses. The “Open Sky” agreement with the EU was signed 
but not ratified and has not come into effect. 
TELECOMMuNICATIONS
24. In the area of fixed telecommunications there is only one opera-
tor. Although there are no legal barriers to the entry of new operators, 
not all regulations (sub statutory texts) have been prepared that are nec-
essary in order to grant licenses to new operators. The penetration level 
in fixed telecommunications is just over 30%.
25. In the area of mobile telecommunications there are three opera-
tors with the penetration level of just over 72% (when taking into 
account the subscribers with several subscriber numbers). This pene-
tration level is at the level of the regional average.
26. The Internet penetration level is relatively low (penetration level 
of 23.4%, while it is as low as 1.6% in the case of broadband Internet).
27. An independent regulatory agency was formed (RATEL), which 
has a large authority in the sphere of communications and radio com-
munication, but not all secondary regulations have been prepared yet 
that are necessary for its smooth operation. 
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28. Telekom Srbije is the only telecommunications company in which 
there is state ownership (80%). Different ideas appear as to what should 
be done with the state-owned capital, but it seems that the discussion in 
this sphere is not linked too much to the future development of tele-
communications in the country. 
MuNICIPAL INFASTRuCTuRE
29. Municipal infrastructure and local utilitties in Serbia are per-
formed by local public utility companies that are controlled by local 
authorities. These authorities, in addition to the decisive control over 
operation of public utility companies, also have the authority for their 
regulation by means of giving approval to each price change. The utility 
companies are very often fully integrated monopolies that, in addition 
to their core activities, perform numerous non-core activities as well. 
The legal provision regarding the contracting-out of certain utility 
activities is practically not applied. 
30. water supply, as the most important utility activity, is character-
ized by still relatively low selling prices, which in most cases do not 
enable the covering of operating expenses (including amortization). 
31. Garbage removal is organized either within separate utility com-
panies or within integrated utility companies providing all utility ser-
vices except for water supply.
32. Privatization of public utility companies has not been considered 
seriously so far, especially considering the complexity of this operation 
and diversity of the utility companies existing in the towns of Serbia, as 
well as a large number of privatizations and PPP models. The question 
of uniform economic regulation of these activities has not been consid-
ered seriously so far, either. The future development of utility activities 
in Serbia depends on the answer to these questions. 
* * *
33. The public policy in the infrastructure in the last eight years has 
been characterized by a lot of indecisiveness regarding privatization, 
its scope and procedure, industry structure and economic regulation. 
While in the first years of the transition most of the attention was 
directed towards the rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure, 
which was heavily damaged primarily due to poor maintenance dur-
ing the previous decade, the completion of the first phase of rehabili-
tation (largely with the funds of international financial institutions) 
led to numerous dilemmas relating to institutional reforms in these 
industries. Discussion still continues about the desirability of keeping 
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the monopoly in the oil industry, the level of vertical integration of 
electric power industry and introduction of competition in fixed tele-
phony (telecommunications), regional networking etc. 
34. Since most of the infrastructure is still linked to public compa-
nies, the data about the largest public companies in Serbia are given in 
the Table 1.
According to the data of the National Bank of Serbia’s Solvency Cen-
tre, Press Release on the realized business results of business entities 
and cooperatives in the Republic of Serbia, the share of public compa-
nies in the total fixed assets is 27.7% and 28.6% in the total capital.
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Health Care System
1. The basis for the reform of the health care system in Serbia was set 
in 2002 in the documents Health Care Policy and the Vision of Health 
Care System Development and then the Strategy and Action Plan of the 
Health Care System Reform until 2015. The most important system 
laws were adopted in the mid-2000: The Law on Medicines and Medi-
cal Devices (2004), Health Care Law, Health Insurance Law and Law on 
Health Workers’ Chambers (December 2006) as well as several sector 
laws: Law on Protection of the Population from Communicable Dis-
eases and the Sanitary Inspection Law (2004), Law on Drugs Precursors 
and the Red Cross Law (2005). A certain number of bylaws (rulebooks) 
are still in the process of making. The Health Council was not set up 
due to the delay in the constitution of the health workers’ chambers that 
are appointing their representatives to this body. That is why the Health 
Care Development Plan and Program that the Assembly is supposed to 
adopt was not passed.
2. In the period 2002–2008 numerous multi-sector strategies that 
affect the health care system development were adopted.19 Besides 
those, there are strategic documents that directly determine the health 
system development such as the National Strategy in the Fight Against 
HIV/AIDS (2005), Strategy for Youth Development and Health (2006), 
Tobacco Control Strategy (2007) and Mental Health Development 
Strategy (2007) and two national programs – Program for Protection 
of the Population from Communicable Diseases from 2002 to 2010 
(2002) and Program for Protection of the Population from Tuberculo-
sis (2005). A few of the strategic documents of the Ministry of Health 
have been prepared but not adopted: Strategy for Provision of Ade-
quate Quantity of Safe Blood and Blood Products, Public Health Strat-
egy, Safe Food Strategy, National Strategy against Drugs and Alcohol 
and National Strategy for Prevention and Control of Mass Non-infec-
tious Diseases.
19 Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003), Action Plan for Children (2004), The Roma 
Action Plan formulated within the Strategy for Integration and Granting New 
Authority to the Roma (2005), Strategy for the Elderly (2005), Strategy for the 
Youth (2008) and Strategy for Prevention and Protection of Children against 
Harassment (2008).
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3. So called preventable and premature mortality is dominating the 
death of the citizens of Serbia. According to the data from 2006 the 
leading causes of death are related to cardiovascular diseases (56.1%) 
and malignant diseases (21.5%), injuries, poisoning and consequences 
of external factors’ activities (4.4%) and symptoms, signs and patho-
logical clinical and laboratory signs (3.1%) which are all diseases and 
conditions that could be prevented by timely activity of the health care 
service and they affect the people in the most productive period of 
their lives. This kind of mortality structure indicates, among other 
things, the quality of health service work as well as the attitude of the 
population towards its own health. Among the health risk factors, the 
most significant individual risk factor is smoking, followed by physi-
cal inactivity, insufficient intake of fruit and vegetable, high blood 
pressure and high cholesterol level in the blood.20 The health survey of 
the Serbian population including 6,156 households in 2006 indicated 
the reduction in smoking frequency by 6.9% compared to 2000, 
increase of physical activity, increase in high blood pressure frequency, 
increase of alcohol consumption, riskier traffic behavior but also bet-
ter knowledge of health risks and more frequent monitoring and 
counseling in the state health institutions regarding the risk of chronic 
non-infectious diseases.
4. One of the fundamental health policy goals is to have a patient/
beneficiary in the center of the health system. A person to protect the 
patient’s rights has been appointed at the institution level, the rights and 
obligations of the patients have been better defined in the new Health 
Care Law and there were several national campaigns for promotion of 
these rights (“You are Entitled”); also better communication was estab-
lished between the health workers and health service beneficiaries 
(“Health Comes with a Smile”). Recently a “white telephone” has been 
introduced in the Ministry of Health for questions, complaints and 
comments of the beneficiaries. The satisfaction of the beneficiaries with 
the health service work monitored for four years through the national 
survey has increased, more in the primary than in secondary health 
care. The health institutions, HIF and the Ministry of Health improved 
transparency of their work by setting up and regularly updating their 
websites.
5. The health care system in the state sector is characterized by a well-
developed network of health institutions on the primary health care 
level (PHCs, health stations and ambulances), secondary health care level 
(general and special hospitals) and tertiary health care level (clinical-hos-
pital centers, clinics and clinical centers). The reform of provision and 
delivery of health service to the population included, first of all, the recon-
struction of health institutions, equipping them with modern equipment, 
20  Disease and injury burden in Serbia, 2003.
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network rationalization regarding the health institutions and the num-
ber of available beds, and then the improvement of the quality and effi-
ciency of the work. At present the working conditions of the health sys-
tem employees are significantly improved, all the necessary equipment 
has been purchased, especially the equipment of high technological 
value (ultra-sound scan, laboratory equipment, angio-halls, scanners, 
magnetic resonance and other); there is a better definition and division 
of the institutions according to the health care level; the rationalization 
of the number of available beds has been executed and there was the 
introduction of monitoring and ranking of the health institutions 
according to the results concerning the continual improvement of the 
health care quality. The so called curative orientation in health service 
delivery was substituted with health promotion and disease prevention 
through the establishment of health centers for prevention within the 
PHCs, development of programs for prevention of risk behavior and 
early detection of the most common diseases, as well as strengthening 
of public health. A significant reform was conducted in dentistry by 
keeping only child and preventive dentistry and emergency interven-
tions within the state sector. The costs of other dental services have been 
transferred to the citizens.
6. The private sector still lags greatly behind in regulation and con-
trol. There were some small steps in recognizing the medicines issued 
on prescription in private practice, the contracting process for diagnos-
tics services for which there are long waiting lists is in progress (scanner 
and magnetic resonance) as well as therapy services, like IVF. Still there 
is the important issue of its more complete functional and financial 
integration into the health system.
7. Health staff development and planning was one of the reform 
priorities. The state health sector had a total of 108,975 employees in 
2007 which is by 17.2% less than in 2000. The reduction was achieved 
by rationalization through the voluntary lay-offs with severance pack-
ages for over 14 thousand workers. The consultant hired to analyze the 
human resources in the health system of Serbia estimated that there was 
a good provision of all medical profiles to the population and that there 
was a surplus of doctors of 10% (compared to the work performance) 
and a 25% surplus of non-medical workers of uneven geographical dis-
tribution which cannot be explained by demographic characteristics of 
the population or their health problems. Moreover, it was pointed out 
that the professional roles and responsibilities of the employees were 
rigid, the planning was centralized and based on obsolete norms, and 
the skills and trainings of health workers did not comply with the 
changes in the system.
8. The number of unemployed doctors has increased, despite the 
employment of 200–300 doctors and 700 nurses a year. On the other 
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hand, due to the “rationalization” process there is a demand for some 
other medical profiles (radiologists, anesthesiologists, cardio sur-
geons) as well as medical nurses for providing care in hospitals. There 
has not been a significant unemployment reduction due to the uncon-
trolled inflow of all medical profession profiles. According to some 
estimates, three to four times more people are being educated than the 
system actually needs. Unless the need for staff is carefully planned on 
the government level (and numerus clausus introduced) and unless 
there is some change of how the faculties and schools are financed, it 
will not be possible to solve the current unfavorable situation. The 
productivity of the people employed in the system does not match the 
investments so far, i.e. according to the results of the analyses, the 
increase in the coverage of population by health workers is not accom-
panied by better performance or more significant health improvement 
of the population.
9. In the last several years considerable means were invested in vari-
ous forms of education and training of the health workers, especially in 
the public health sector (Public Health School Center was opened at the 
Faculty of Medicine in Belgrade) and the EU has granted funds in the 
amount of 5 million Euros to establish a national center for education in 
the area of health management. By establishing health workers’ cham-
bers the process of licensing was regulated and initiated. Professional 
satisfaction of the employees has increased based on the national survey 
in all the state health institutions, especially the satisfaction with the 
conditions of work, equipment and relations between the people. They 
are still dissatisfied with their income although the employee salaries in 
the health care system have considerably increased in the last period.
10. Financing the health care system is a critical point in the health 
care system reform in Serbia. The share of the overall costs for the 
health care in the domestic product was 7.6% in 2007 and it has slightly 
increased since 2000 (table 1). The per capita health care cost increased 
from 131 Euros in 2003 to 230 Euros in 2007 (the estimates say it will 
be 255 Euros in 2008). The IT system development in the republican 
Health Insurance Fund (HIF) resulted in the establishment of the 
insuree database and better control of costs and sick leaves. All debts 
were settled in 2007 and the financing of health institutions was stabi-
lized. The medicines and medical supplies procurement was improved 
and the number of medicines from a so called “positive list” has dou-
bled since 2004 (700 generic medicines). Around 1.2 million citizens 
of Serbia have no insurance and not enough money is allocated from 
the budget in order to provide the health care standard that 6.5 mil-
lion health insurees and members of their families have, which badly 
affects the equity of the health care system and availability of health 
service to these vulnerable groups (uninsured, refugees and internally 
displaced persons).
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Table 1 
The health care expenditure in the Republic of Serbia from 2000 to 2006
Selected indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total health care 
expenditure as a % of 
GDP
7.1 7.3 8.3 8.3 8.0 8.0 7.6
External resources for 
health care as a % of 
GDP 
1.1 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.8
State health care 
expenditure as a % of 
total expenditure
67.4 66.0 70.7 72.4 71.6 71.9 71.0
Private sector 
expenditure as a % of 
total expenditure
32.5 34.0 29.3 27.6 28.4 28.1 29.0
 “Out of the pocket” 
spending as a % of the 
private sector 
expenditure
85.2 85.3 85.3 85.3 86.4 86.7 86.7
Total per capita health 
care expenditure (Euros) 51 84 131 170 199 212 247
Data source: The National Health Account (NHA) sub-project of the World Bank 
“Health Project in Serbia,” Ministry of Health of the RS, Belgrade, 2003–2008
11. One of the priorities in the following period is definitively the 
change in the health system financing. Unless there is change in the 
financing, so that money does not follow the existing structure and staff 
but the patients’ movements through the system, there will be no 
increase in the efficiency and quality of work as the most important 
intermediary goals of the health system. There were no considerable 
improvements concerning the payment of service providers for their 
work. As a result, there is low efficiency and productivity of work as 
well as a lack of incentive for improving the quality of the service pro-
vided to the citizens. At the primary health care level a doctor of choice 
is introduced as a “gatekeeper at the entrance to the system” and he will 
be paid according to the number of beneficiaries who decide to be 
treated by him. Capitation formula is being developed for several years 
with the support of the World Bank and the EU projects. At the second-
ary health care level a hospital payment system is being developed 
according to the model of similar diagnostic groups, but this process is 
still in progress, also with the World Bank’s support. The primary health 
care is much more interested in the introduction of changes in the man-
ner of payment of the health service providers for their work while 
changes at the secondary and especially tertiary health care are accom-
panied by much greater resistance.
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12. The operation of the National Health Insurance Fund should be 
considerably improved by strengthening the control and regulatory 
functions (control of the contribution payments is not within their 
mandate), especially at the level of subsidiaries the work of which is still 
insufficiently transparent. The population is getting old which will addi-
tionally burden the health funds. Thus, it is important to formulate 
strategies for obtaining financial means from other sources. So far, one 
dinar from every pack of cigarettes sold is the only additional source of 
financing the health care and it is spent for stimulating the promotion 
of health and prevention of smoking (1/3 of the total fund), purchase of 
anti-tumor drugs (1/3) and equipping the angio-hall (1/3) for improved 
diagnostic of cardiovascular diseases. One of the priorities is financial 
protection of beneficiaries from “out of the pocket” payments that can 
affect their standard of living, especially the vulnerable groups whose 
access to health service might be jeopardized. Thus, according to the 
new Rulebook on co-payment (personal participation of insured persons 
in the health care costs) the poor people who earn less than the mini-
mum personal income are exempt from paying. The current political 
environment implies that the emphasis will be on the social justice and 
greater socialization of all risks which could slow down the changes in 
the area of financing.
13. Inclusion of the private sector in the health system will partially 
be realized through the development of a voluntary health insurance. 
The founding document is being prepared although it is still not certain 
whether this type of insurance will be a part of HIF or an independent 
institution. The licensing of health workers will provide an insight into 
the exact number of full-time employees in the private sector which is 
about to be better regulated although it was not identified as a priority 
in the health system development. The attempt to include this sector 
into the continuous quality improvement program failed although the 
reporting on the health service utilization and registered morbidity has 
improved. The private sector of the health system is subject to regular 
inspections in the last couple of years.
14. Priorities of the health care system reform concerning the 
level of health system management (so called good business prac-
tice) are advancement of management on all levels, especially better 
control mechanisms and greater accountability for the needs and 
expectations of beneficiaries, above all the non-medical expectations 
relating to satisfaction, better communication and enforcement of 
health care rights. The fight against corruption is also found in this 
group of priorities, especially charging for the services from manda-
tory insurance and transferring the patients to the private sector, as 
well as strengthening the inspection service for better quality control 
and work efficiency.
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15. Promotion of health and prevention of diseases on all levels 
should be the basic strategic orientation for the improvement of health 
of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia having in mind that a lot has 
been invested into buildings, equipment and provision of medicines 
and medical devices. Development, careful implementation and evalua-
tion of programs for prevention of risk factors, prevention, eradication 
and control of mass non-communicable diseases, screening, especially 
malignant diseases with timely and efficient treatment and rehabilita-
tion – all those are just initiated activities and the results of their effect 
on people’s health will be visible in the future.
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Social Protection
THE REFORMS SO FAR
1. After the changes of October 5, the social security network was 
completely ruined, so the first activities in the social protection were 
directed to stabilizing the system. With considerable donor support the 
servicing of debts accumulating for many years has started, as well as 
establishing regular payments of remuneration, renovating the homes 
for beneficiaries’ accommodation, etc. The long-term strategic orienta-
tions were formulated through the inter-sector and sector strategies, 
and above all through the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003) and Social 
Protection Development Strategy (2005).
2. The system of remuneration was considerably altered by the 
legal amendments in the first years of transition. The Law on Finan-
cial Support of Families with Children (2002) and Amendments to the 
Law on Social Protection and Provision of Social Security of the Citi-
zens (2004) brought about the annulment of differences in criteria for 
allocating the remunerations and the introduction of the single abso-
lute poverty line on the republic level, providing the maintenance of 
actual remuneration value by indexing the cost of living, with contin-
ual access to rights. Moreover, the amount based on the right to have 
third parties’ care and assistance for old and disabled persons was 
greatly increased, especially for the beneficiaries with the highest 
degree of disability. Along with that the measures of social policy were 
separated from the measures of population policy. Child allowance 
was defined exclusively as a social policy measure, the universal right 
to child allowance was revoked, the amount of the allowance became 
the same regardless of the order in which the children were born and 
better targeting of the poor was provided by precisely defining the 
income and assets that are taken into consideration in identifying the 
right. The families with children with special needs, self-supporting 
parents, foster parents and guardians were put in a much favorable 
position. Parental allowance (a one-off cash benefit given at the birth 
of a child) is introduced as a birth incentive measure.
3. While the number of financial family support (MOP) beneficiaries 
declined during the 1990-ies, mainly as a result of the fact that 
Reforms in Serbia: Achievements and Challenges72
remunerations were not regularly paid, the number of beneficiaries has 
grown after the year 2000, especially after the adoption of new legal 
solutions which were directed to that goal. According to the 2007 data 
over 50 thousand families receive the financial family support (MOP), 
which is approximately 130 thousand individuals. Over 3 billion dinars 
(only 0.12% of GDP) was allocated for this purpose from the budget. 
The average monthly amount was around 5000 dinars per family, and 
2000 dinars per individual. Along with the funds from a national level, 
almost all municipalities in Serbia pay the so called one-off pecuniary 
aid, mainly to the same beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of financial fam-
ily support with children have the right to receive the child allowance at 
the same time.
4. Contrary to these developments, the number of child allowance 
beneficiaries has declined as expected, in accordance with the new pol-
icy and it decreased from 590 thousand in 2001 to 430 thousand in 
2007. At present the child allowance is 1700 dinars per child (the 
increased amount is 2200 dinars), and the overall financing cost is 7.6 
billion dinars (0.3 % of GDP).
5. The latest Living Standard Measurement Survey in Serbia indicates 
that the changes allowed better targeting and aiming at the poor and 
that the efficiency of the social programs providing for most of the total 
spending of the poorest households has increased.21
6. There were two mechanisms for the implementation of reforms 
in the social welfare service area: reform projects and special funds 
for financing the projects at the local level. First the Fund for Financ-
ing the Associations of the Disabled Persons was established (2002) 
and then the Social Innovation Fund (2003); both as mechanisms for 
the alternative social welfare development, changes at the local level 
and the introduction of the NGO sector in service delivery. Both funds 
represent the mechanisms of decentralization and reform of the sys-
tem since they finance the projects at the local level and new alterna-
tive services that are not a part of the system or are not developed 
enough. As a result of reform efforts in the service area there was a 
considerable increase in the number of children in foster families 
(from 1600 in 2001 to almost 4000 children in 2007, whereas there are 
only 750 children in the homes for children without parental care 
compared to over 2200 before the commencement of reforms); there 
was an increase in the number of beneficiaries of home care and assis-
tance, day care for children and adults with disability; also the pro-
tected housing development has started, as well as personal assistant 
service and shelters for the victims of family violence. In the previous 
21 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, World Bank, DFID, Living Standard 
Measurement Survey – Serbia 2002–2007, 2007, page 76
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year there was an improvement in the design of the minimum stan-
dards of social welfare service as well as in the support and monitor-
ing mechanisms. In over two thirds of the municipalities in Serbia the 
design of the plans for social welfare development is in the final phase, 
well supported by the donors.
STRATEGIC ORIENTATION OF FuRTHER CHANGES 
It is necessary, in the medium-term, to examine the cash benefits, 
both from the aspect of targeting and administrative procedures and 
the aspect of census adequacy and the amounts of the benefits alone. 
The earlier surveys clearly showed the flaws of both institutes, for exam-
ple, the right to child allowance of the families with children which are 
not poor (mistake of inclusion), excluding the right to financial support 
of poor families (mistake of exclusion), inadequate equivalency scales 
in the system of financial family support that are in favor of small house-
holds, excessive requests concerning the administrative procedures 
which, on one hand, include the elements of self-targeting, but on the 
other hand, create an obstacle for many of the poorest families to enforce 
their rights to cash benefits. In line with the redefined role of the social 
work center it is necessary to resolve the dilemmas concerning the iden-
tification of the administrative procedures for the enforcement of rights 
and further IT strengthening, both on the local and national level, in 
order for the system to function better.
7. Strategically, one of the important issues in this area is the inclu-
sion of some form of active participation of cash benefits beneficia-
ries. The active participation can have different forms and it can be 
individualized, up to the level of a single beneficiary. In principle, it 
includes the conditioning of aid, but it can also mean additional 
amounts of cash benefits for certain forms of conditioning. Determin-
ing the amounts of additional benefits in case of a job engagement is 
surely one of the greatest challenges in designing the activation 
schemes. Depending on the identified basic problem the beneficiary 
may be referred to public works engagement, to retraining and addi-
tional training, to attend the adult education program but also to fam-
ily therapy, therapy for addictive diseases etc. Within the child allow-
ance institute it is possible to provide for high school children to 
enforce their right to child allowance not only if they attend the classes 
regularly but also if they attend the unpaid programs to gain practice 
and working experience, to have additional schooling, to belatedly 
finish the primary school etc. It is also of importance to carefully iden-
tify the beneficiaries who could be temporarily or permanently exempt 
from these programs, for example pregnant women and self-support-
ing parents with small children, individuals taking care of a severely 
disabled household member etc. Designing the activation schemes is a 
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special challenge having in mind the accessibility of certain services 
necessary for the implementation of programs on the local level. 
Including the activation elements into the social assistance scheme 
should contribute to the better targeting of cash benefits beneficiaries, 
exclusion from the “rights” of those engaged in gray economy, but also 
in the social inclusion of the most vulnerable groups. It is of great 
importance that the formulation of activation programs for social 
welfare beneficiaries is harmonized with the appropriate programs 
designed for the unemployed, both on the strategic and implementa-
tion level. It is also necessary to properly define the roles and coopera-
tion between the local self-governments, social work centers and the 
national employment service.
8. Decentralization, deinstitutionalization and further development 
of alternative social welfare services remain the most important strate-
gic development orientations in the area of services.
In the medium-term one can primarily expect the decentralization of 
competence in the area of services of residential protection of the old to 
Vojvodina and Belgrade. There is an option to transfer this competence 
to other cities in Serbia as well. In the same period one can expect the 
completion of reform processes in the protection of children and youth 
without parental care which would allow for this competence to be 
decentralized in the same manner.
9. Deinstitutionalization and further development of alternative 
social welfare services must be considered within the uniform reform 
efforts. Both processes are also inseparable from the process of institu-
tion transformation, in order to ensure that the resources trapped in the 
residential institutions do not represent an obstacle but an integral part 
of the system change. Further reforms include the reduction in the share 
of institutional protection, significant improvement in the quality of 
institutional protection for those beneficiaries for which it is still neces-
sary and strong development of all alternative services forms. The objec-
tive of the medium-term reforms is for these so called alternative ser-
vices to become the main form of protection and for residential protec-
tion to become a short-term solution, the last option.
 
10. The further development of alternative social welfare services 
includes the provision of additional funds for their financing from a 
national level. In the long-run, it is obvious that financing of the social 
welfare services within the local government’s mandate has to be con-
tinuously supported in a regulated way from the national budget at the 
central level. Instead of being unmarked, these transfers should be ear-
marked in order to ensure that they are not spent for other purposes but 
exclusively for social welfare. At the same time, it does not mean that 
every dinar would be earmarked according to the type and scope of the 
service it should be spent on. The transfer amount could be formulated 
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so that it is allocated to the municipalities on the basis of a formula that 
would consider the per capita fiscal capacity of the municipality but also 
the need for social welfare services. Due to the limited budgetary capac-
ity in the medium-term, the additional funds from the central budget 
intended for the social welfare service development could be transferred 
only to less developed municipalities, for example, those whose local 
budget is below the national average and all in a form of some sort of 
complementary grants. Coming back to the topic of decentralization 
within this context, the main issue of social welfare service decentral-
ization is not just the issue of “lowering the competence” from the cen-
tral to the lower levels of government but it is also the issue of encourag-
ing development of those services that are already totally within the 
local self-government mandate and the development of which is the 
ultimate strategic goal that needs to enable the advancement of the situ-
ation for certain vulnerable groups.
11. In the area of service delivery it is necessary to ensure the separa-
tion of the role of the service buyer/financier from the role of the ser-
vice deliverer, to stimulate competition and include the non-govern-
mental stakeholders in the service delivery area, to solve the issue of 
beneficiary participation in the service cost in a more rational way etc. 
At the same time, it is necessary to formulate and clearly define the new 
role of the social work centers and their function in the system. In the 
medium-term, Serbia should finalize the establishment of all regulatory 
mechanisms that are the necessary precondition of the further social 
welfare development: formulating the minimum service standards, 
rules for licensing and accreditation of the service providers but also the 
strengthening of control mechanisms on the national and local levels. 
Strengthening of the professional capacity is a particularly important 
precondition for the accomplishment of all strategic goals of social 
welfare.
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE LABOR MARkET POLICY
 1. The loss of a huge number of jobs in the state-owned and social-
ly-owned sector was an expected result of transition and commence-
ment of privatization process in 2001. The challenge facing the eco-
nomic policy makers was twofold. On one hand, it was necessary to 
provide a sufficiently generous compensation for the workers facing the 
loss of their jobs so as not to jeopardize their existence while they are 
unemployed, as well as to ensure the political sustainability of the 
reforms. On the other hand, it was necessary to increase the chances for 
employment of the unemployed people, both by improving their rela-
tive chances through participation in the active labor market programs 
and by stimulating greater employment opportunities in the economy 
as a whole.
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2. Generally speaking, greater success was accomplished in tempo-
rary financial provision for the workers who lost their jobs than in 
their re-employment. However, the costs of the unemployment benefit 
and severance were very high and were growing over the observed 
period and the efficiency of their usage was questionable. Relatively 
small funds were spent on the active labor market policy and its range 
was limited. Broadly speaking, there was no consistent employment 
policy since, as a rule, no one took into the account the effects of gen-
eral reform policies and employment measures and the possibility of 
creating new jobs.
Table 1 
Funds spend on benefits
Benefit, 
average 
number of 
beneficiaries
Benefit 
costs, in 
mil. din
Active 
programs, 
in mil. din
Benefit, 
% of the 
programmatic 
budget of NES
Active 
programs, % 
of the NES 
budget
2000 47,393 758 521 59.3 40.7
2001 51,156 2,429 1,057 70.2 29.8
2002 69,566 4,716 1,306 78.3 21.7
2003 90,995 7,891 881 90.0 10.0
2004 76,584 11,404 410 96.5 3.5
2005 63,295 12,639 1,545 89.1 10.9
2006 75,059 15,850 1,540 91.1 8.9
2007 71,334 17,920 2,165 89.2 10.8
Source: Financial reports of the National Employment Service, 2000–2007
3. The unemployment benefit system inherited from the 1990-
ies was rather generous and characterized by high replacement 
ratio and benefits were received over long periods, up to 36 months; 
even much longer for certain categories. However, during the 1990-
ies the share of the beneficiaries of the benefit in the number of 
registered unemployed persons did not exceed 5–6% which made it 
possible for the benefits to be fully financed from the unemploy-
ment insurance.
4. Although it was expected that the number of unemployment 
benefit beneficiaries would increase with the beginning of mass 
lay-offs, there was only a moderate increase, and the scope of ben-
eficiaries has never much exceeded 10% of the number of regis-
tered unemployed persons (maximum number of beneficiaries – 
91,000 was reached in 2003). The reason is the establishment of the 
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transition fund in 2002 which provided for the relatively high sev-
erance to the fired workers but with the simultaneous loss of the 
right to use the benefits.
5. The new law adopted in 2003 reduced the rights on the grounds 
of insurance in case of unemployment, but the rules remained rela-
tively generous in comparison. The maximum duration of benefit 
receipt is 24 months. The replacement ratio was defined as 60% of 
the employed person’s average salary in the last three months, with 
the reduction to 50% after three months of usage until the right to 
receive the benefit expired. However, since it was regulated that the 
minimum benefit cannot be lower than the minimum salary, for 
many beneficiaries the replacement ratio is considerably higher, and 
for some even higher than 100%. Having in mind the fast growth of 
the average salary and high replacement ratio, the overall expendi-
tures for unemployment grew very quickly and in 2007 they reached 
2000 million Euros, (almost 1% of GDP) which was almost 90% of 
the total programmatic budget of the National Employment Service.
6. The transition fund was established in 2002 as a part of the 
Social Program intended for the surplus of employees with the aim 
to accelerate the restructuring and privatization of the socially-
owned and public enterprises through the provision of stimulative 
severances (above the legal minimum) for voluntary collective dis-
missals, as well as to facilitate the re-employment of the “surplus” of 
workers through establishment of transition centers for counseling, 
training and additional education. Huge funds of almost 300 million 
Euros were cumulatively spent on payments of stimulative sever-
ances for around 150 000 workers in the period from 2002 to 2007, 
which on average accounts for around 0.4% of GDP a year. On the 
other hand, the transitional centers and other activation services of 
the Social Program did not show any significant results in the re-
employment of the surpluses. The budget for 2008 provides for 
almost 90 million Euros to be allocated for severances through the 
Transition Fund. One should bear in mind that the overall sum of 
severances paid to the dismissed workers is considerably higher.
7. The implementation of active labor market policy programs 
belongs to the primary competence of the National Employment Ser-
vice (NES). The reform of NES began in 2001 and it intensified after 
the adoption of Law on Employment in 2003. The intermediary and 
advisory work with the beneficiaries is particularly enhanced by intro-
ducing the individual action plans for those unemployed for a long 
time and members of vulnerable groups, then introducing employ-
ment fairs, job clubs and strengthening the contact with employees. 
The training programs remained relatively modest in scope. The two 
main programs in the area of employment subsidies are support to the 
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self–employment and the so called regional employment programs, as 
subsidies to the employers for new employment.
8. Despite the significant progress, the NES still hasn’t reached 
the satisfactory degree of efficiency. The number of advisors com-
pared to the number of the unemployed persons is very unfavorable. 
The mechanisms for monitoring, process evaluation and the evalua-
tion of active programs’ effects have not been established, as well as 
the system for forecasting the labor market flows. The greatest prog-
ress was made in the area of intermediation and advisory service. 
The trainings are mostly of a general type, and relatively small means 
are allocated for them despite the growing “skills gap”. Subsidies for 
self-employment were given to a considerable number of beneficia-
ries, around 5000 a year on average but the new businesses survival 
rate seems (in the absence of official reports and evaluations) rather 
disappointing. On the other hand, the subsidies for the employers 
seem to suffer more from the deadweight effect, and they were 
awarded in a very arbitrary manner e.g. equally to the developed and 
undeveloped regions. The public works programs were also con-
ducted during 2006 and 2007. In principle, they are mainly supposed 
to provide a temporary financial support and working experience to 
the discouraged, long-term unemployed, poor workers and in that 
way increase their future ability of being employed. In practice, this 
goal was sometimes in the shadow of subsidizing useful local activi-
ties relatively independent of the degree of engagement of the mem-
bers of particularly vulnerable groups.
9. Further reforms in the area of institutional regulation and 
practical implementation of the passive an active labor market 
programs are necessary. It is necessary to change the Law on 
Employment and Unemployment Insurance in order to establish a 
consolidated annual planning of active labor market programs within 
the regular budgetary cycle, having in mind all the incentive mea-
sures for employment that are also being implemented through the 
other state agencies. That should be the first step to conducting the 
practical integrated national employment policy. The other recom-
mendation for the amendment of the law concerns the introduction 
of stronger incentives for the activation of the unemployed persons, 
especially the unemployment benefit beneficiaries through reducing 
the period of receipt of the benefit and replacement ratio on one 
hand, and on the other, in case they find a job earlier, keeping the 
right to receive a part of the benefit until the maximum deadline 
expires. Finally, the process evaluation and the evaluation of the 
active programs net effects should be institutionalized.
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DEVELOPMENT SINCE 2000
1. The situation in the area of education was in many ways distressing 
in 2000: the teaching staff was lacking professionalism, the curriculum 
and textbooks were obsolete, the school network was inadequate and 
unrestored, the financing system was not transparent, the student 
achievements were low. In a situation like that the education reform 
became a priority. There are two directions of changes in the period 
after 2000:
2. Stabile growth of investment into education, growth of salaries 
and investment into renovation and equipment of school buildings. The 
percentage of GDP set aside for education was increasing from 2.7% in 
2001 to 3.7% in 2007 and there has been an evident stable growth of the 
employee salaries at the rate of 20–30% a year from 2000 and with a 
multiple leap in 2000 and 2001. The investments into renovation and 
equipment of school buildings have also considerably increased22 but in 
the budget of the Ministry of Education there is still an excessive share 
of salaries to the detriment of development programs, approximately 
90%. The need for a successive increase of GDP percentage for educa-
tion up to the level of 6% became widely accepted and stated in many 
inter-sector strategic documents in Serbia.
3. The development of educational policy and education reform 
with periodical cessations. There are two different phases of the educa-
tion system reform in the period 2000–2008:
The changes in the period 2000–200423. The beginning of changes was 
marked by a new strategy of education development24 based on the 
analyses and local consultations. The Law on Fundamentals of 
Educational System and Upbringing from 2003 encompassed all the 
anticipated and initiated changes in pre-university education with the 
22 So, for example, the number of students per computer in high schools declined 
from almost 1:100 at the beginning of 2000s to around 1:18 in 2008.
23 For details see Kovac Cerovic, T. et all (2004): Quality Education for All. Belgrade, 
Ministry of Education and Sports, or Quality Education for All, The Challenges of 
Education Reforms in Serbia at www.see-educoop.net
24 T. Kovac Cerovic and Lj. Levkov (ed): Quality Education for All, A Way Toward 
the Developed Society, Ministry of Education and Sports, Belgrade, 2002
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implementation period until 2011. New institutions for education devel-
opment support were created, professional standards for teachers were 
introduced (licensing, professional development and advancement), as 
well as the new regulation of the curriculum based on outcomes and 
standards (national curriculum framework, school program) and new 
quality assurance system (external evaluation through final exams, 
national and international testing and redirection of the inspection sys-
tem to the school quality assurance system). The school development 
planning became obligatory, the school autonomy was increased, the 
textbook publishing policy was liberalized and the introduction of the 
mandatory preschool education starting from 2007 was announced. 
The reorganizing of the vocational secondary school network began in 
line with the labor market needs (the new educational profiles started 
being introduced and the creation of the mixed secondary schools with 
different profiles was allowed). The preparations for the future decen-
tralization of the system began at that time. The effects of these changes 
however, were not fully accomplished because after the year 2004 the 
reforms slowed down.
The changes in the period 2004–2008. With the adoption of the Law 
on Higher Education in 2005 the compliance with the Bologna process 
begun. The Universities introduced the new curricula and reduced the 
duration of studies from around 11 years in 2001 to around 7 years in 
2007. In secondary education the piloting of the new educational pro-
files continued and in 2006 the Vocational Education Development 
Strategy was adopted. However, the implementation is slow, due to the 
resistance of the teaching staff among other things. The experimental 
classes were introduced in 146 vocational secondary schools, with 53 
new or innovated profiles in 13 areas of work, with the new curriculum 
and accompanied by teaching staff training and equipping the schools. 
Around 18,000 students (6.5% of the secondary school students) were 
enrolled into the new educational profiles in 2007. A new IT profile was 
introduced to comprehensive secondary schools (gymnasiums) with 
two classes each in 11 schools in central Serbia. In primary education, 
pursuant to the Amendments to the Law on Fundamentals of Educa-
tional System and Upbringing from 2004 a part of reform innovations 
was cancelled (curricula were again regulated through the content, the 
education system structure was kept in two cycles, the teacher licenses 
were not renewable) and the other part was postponed (external final 
exams). However, during this period the work on the school develop-
ment plans was continued, as well as the in-service teacher training, lib-
eralization of the textbook publishing policy and finishing of EMIS. The 
implementation of the mandatory preschool education began in 2006. 
The existing capacity, however, is not sufficient for the complete out-
reach of children, especially in the big cities. A School without Violence 
Project was initiated in cooperation with UNICEF in 2005 and 110 pri-
mary schools (around 10%) took part.
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4. Despite the previous changes, the education system has still not 
responded to several basic challenges:
Low education quality.•	  The international surveys PISA and TIMSS 
for education outcome assessment at the end of the primary 
education show that the achievement in Serbia is below the 
average, 25and the results from 2006 are worse than those from 
2003. The pupils in Serbia are behind the average OECD 
achievement for about one year in mathematics and science, and 
about two years in reading literacy. This could be the result of 
inadequacy of the fact-oriented curriculum that does not prepare 
the pupils for the transfer of knowledge into the new areas and 
situations in life. A high dispersion of scores in Serbia cannot be 
explained by the influence of social and economic status or the 
regional differences but mostly by the differences among the 
schools and teachers, which points to the lack of standards 
regarding the quality of the teaching process and the teachers 
themselves.
The Roma children •	 are not covered by preschool education; only 
30% of them complete the primary education and only 10% enroll 
further to a higher education level. Moreover, the Roma children 
are more frequently referred to special schools from which there is 
no access to further education or labor market. The Action Plan 
for the Roma Education is mostly not implemented.
Inclusion of children with special needs•	  into the regular kindergartens 
and schools began in 2005 but for now, it exists only as an initiative 
of the non-governmental and international organizations. The 
strategic documents that are supposed to regulate this area are still 
not adopted and the pilot initiatives in 10 cities in Serbia are taking 
place without clear guidelines from the ministry.
Serbia is one of the rare European countries that did not pay •	
attention to additional needs of the poor children in education. 
Although schooling is free, it requires substantial financial 
participation of the parents; the schools do not offer free or 
subsidized meals. The first step in giving scholarships to poor 
students according to the social criterion was not taken until 2008: 
1000 scholarships and tutoring of the scholarship holders will be 
financed out of NIP funds.
The system that should respond to the needs of •	 literacy, retraining 
and additional training actually does not exist. The adult education 
was reduced from 80 schools in the 80-ies to only 14. The 
qualification training for employment is offered by the National 
Employment Service but only for known employers and without a 
certificate that would have a lasting validity. The Strategy for Adult 
25 OECD (2004): Learning for Tomorrow’s World: First Results from PISA 2003, and 
OECD (2006): Assessing scientific, mathematical and reading literacy. Paris: OECD 
Publications www.pisa.oecd.org
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Education was adopted by the end of 2006 but it was not applied 
so far.
5. Inefficiency of the education system is growing. A constantly 
declining teacher to student ratio is an unfavorable indicator; it went 
from 1: 16.5 in primary schools and 1:13.6 in secondary schools in 2000, 
to 1:13.8 in primary and only 10.7 in secondary schools, while the 
OECD average is 15.2 and 13.0. Such a trend is financially unsustain-
able. It does not only reflect the demographic decline in the number of 
students but the increase in the number of teachers during the recent 
years. The increase was partially justifiable due to the introduction of 
new elective subjects, new profiles and limiting the size of the class to 30 
students, but it is not accompanied by the reduced number of teachers 
in schools that educate the profiles of which there is a surplus. The main 
source of inefficiency is still the inadequate school network, i.e. a great 
number of small schools (more than 300 with less than 5 students).
FuTuRE CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES
6. The present education system shows serious signs of growing dis-
functionality and inefficiency. Without some considerable change these 
system mistakes will only enhance which represents a serious risk for 
the development of the country. The priories should be the following:
Develop an adult education system•	 , especially for the younger 
population (20–34 years of age, who represent around 50% of the 
unemployed) so that the premises and human resources of primary 
and secondary school are used to the maximum. Additional option 
and gain would be if the capitation formula would be used in 
payment for the adult education which would ensure the interest 
of schools and contribute to acquiring experience of the new way 
of financing.
Accelerate and •	 finish the reform of the vocational secondary 
education aiming at full compliance with the labor market needs. 
This asks for closing down the schools that educate the profiles of 
which there is a surplus on the market and expansion of new and 
innovative profiles. The status of the vocational subject teachers 
who are specialized in profiles that no longer have access to the 
market could be solved by severance, while other teachers could 
be redirected to the adult education.
Reduce the attrition in primary education.•	  The basic mechanisms 
for that are twofold: on one hand, it is necessary to enhance the 
social benefits for poor children (scholarships, meals, textbooks), 
and on the other hand, to increase the attractiveness of learning 
and quality of the teaching process through the curriculum 
reorganization, in-service training of the teachers, new quality 
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assurance mechanisms etc. The results of these changes will also 
contribute to the increase of the primary education quality.
Increase the capacity and quality and prolong the duration of•	  
preschool education in a selective way, i.e. use the positive effects of 
early learning to the maximum, especially for the vulnerable 
groups. A good option here would be to have the financing 
according to the capitation formula with stimulative weights for 
inclusion of the children from vulnerable groups and transfer of 
means from the budget to the municipalities, since the 
responsibility of the municipalities in this education segment is 
already the greatest. Until the system has been completely set up it 
is necessary to introduce an affirmative initiative for the enrolment 
of children from these groups.
Gradually introduce a new way of •	 financing education according to 
the capitation formula in order to raise the internal efficiency of 
the system. Along with the piloting of capitation formula in 
preschool education and adult education, it is necessary to 
carefully try out the weights in city schools, but also in the 
environments where education is inevitably more expensive 
(where the ethnic minorities live, around Roma settlements or in 
the areas where small schools are located). The introduction of a 
new way of financing should happen in phases within several 
years, with the possibility of postponement for the municipalities 
with low capacity and/or the necessity for serious school network 
adjustment. Special attention should be paid to make the weights 
seem stimulative and to include the children with special needs 
and children from vulnerable groups.
7. Decentralization. Despite the initial attempts to increase the role 
of municipalities and schools, the education system remained highly 
centralized and the first experiences abounded in negative examples 
(political disputes within the school boards, the municipalities default-
ing in payment for the in-service training etc), so the responsibility of 
parents and school accountability towards the beneficiaries were 
reduced rather than increased. Since the education standards have not 
yet been adopted, the issue of access to education has not been solved, 
EMIS has not been completed, the final exams and all the other control 
mechanisms have just started and there is not enough educational pol-
icy knowledge on the local level, the swift decentralization without the 
necessary preliminary requirements would not contribute to the educa-
tion quality increase. However, in order to have a long-term efficiency, 
the preparations must continue.
8. There are three more additional challenges that need to be quickly 
addressed with special attention: 
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8.1. Teaching staff. Serbia still does not have a coherent policy regulat-
ing the teaching vocation (attracting, educating, advancing the teachers 
and promoting the teaching profession and competencies). The ongo-
ing higher education reform could, to a great extent, respond to the 
needs of pre-university education and creation of contemporary staff 
through interdisciplinary teaching, increasing the share of practice in 
the preparation of teachers, inter-university links in order to obtain 
teacher competencies and offers for lifelong learning of the teachers.
8.2. Financing. Apart from the insufficient designation of funds and 
internal inefficiency, Serbia is not using any other potential sources for 
increasing the allocations for education. Neither the donations for edu-
cation nor the employers’ investments are encouraged.
8.3. General knowledge of the system and educational policy options 
in Serbia is very low. There are no specialized studies or institute for 
education policy, the financing of applied research is poor, and the pub-
lications in the area of education policy are not a part of the practice. 
Therefore, simultaneously with the reform implementation, it is neces-
sary to increase the knowledge of this area both among the profession-
als and in general public, and by doing so ensure better understanding 
of the changes and greater participation in them.
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Pension Insurance
1. Generally speaking, the pension system in Serbia is still facing 
serious difficulties. It seriously burdens its financiers (the employees 
and the budget) while pensioners believe they receive insufficient 
pensions. A system no one is satisfied with is doubtlessly at crisis 
point. According to the financial aspect, pension system is undergo-
ing crisis since it has been facing considerable deficits in revenues in 
comparison with expenditures: Pension and Disability Insurance 
(PIO) Fund’s deficit is sometimes hidden, sometimes open, but always 
present.
2. Peak of difficulties in pension financing was reached in the course 
of 1990-ies, during crisis, UN sanctions and economic regress, with 
redundancies, avoidance of contribution payments and widespread 
gray economy. Financing urged for more inventive solutions, particu-
larly due to the fact that pensioners were a significant electoral body. 
Hence, adjustment to reduced resources was not carried out by formal 
decrease in pensioners’ rights, but by applying other methods: twelve 
pensions were rarely paid during one year, in the period 1994–1995 
pensions were reduced in illegal manner – by an ordinary act of the 
Serbian Government (this resulted in the so-called large debt), the 
pensions were paid in tokens for electricity; since the pensions were 
several months late the debt to pensioners was constantly devalued 
through inflation etc.
Latest basic figures are the following:
Table 1 
Pensioners 2007
Average pension, 
RSD 
Number of 
pensioners
Employed  14,996 1,279,239
Self-employed  14,533 48,491
Farmer  5,613 229,392
Total 1,557,122
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Average pensions in February, 2008 were 17,789 (employed), 17,340 
(self-employed) and 6,650 (farmer), which resulted in the total average 
pension of 16,610 RSD.
HISTORY OF CHANGES 
3. Several important steps in pension system reform were made in 
the course of 2001: 
regular payments of twelve pensions per year were achieved,•	
pension reform strategy in Serbia was examined and it was •	
concluded that there was no need for a reform by the so-called 
three-pillar World Bank’s model due to significant transition-
related expenses, underdeveloped financial market in Serbia and 
insufficiently convincing experiences of other countries; 
advantage was given to the reform of existing public pension 
system and introduction of voluntary private insurance,
pension contribution rate was lowered from 32 to 19.6%, which, •	
together with reduction of other contributions, was supposed to 
stimulate employment and abandonment of gray economy; 
Pension Fund deficit was covered by the Republic’s budget,
pension age limit was raised by three years, from 55 to 58 for •	
women and from 60 to 63 for men, with a minimal age limit 
raised from 50 to 53; hence, Serbia caught up with other transition 
countries that started with these changes earlier, but mainly 
opted for gradual raising of the age limit; the main purpose was 
to downsize the number of pensioners in medium-term 
timeframe,
pensions were no longer indexed in line with the salaries; the •	
so-called Swiss formula was introduced, i.e. pensions were 
harmonized by combining the pay increase and costs of living 
increase, with the same weight; thus, the average pension increase 
was decelerated in terms of average pay increase, in order to 
decrease the already unsustainable deficit in the pension fund. 
A very rapid growth of real salaries in the course of the following 
years resulted in higher pensions, regardless of the Swiss formula that 
was supposed to slow this process down in comparison with the sala-
ries, which it did. However, salaries went up quicker than the GDP. At 
the same time, the raised retirement age limit brought about more mod-
erate effects during the first application years, whereas decrease in the 
pension contribution seriously deteriorated the pension system finances, 
as well as the budget. 
4. The new Law on the Pension and Disability Insurance from April, 
2003 was the next step with the following crucial changes: 
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definition of pensions on the basis of salary during the whole •	
service, which improved the equity of the system, but failed to 
bring any direct financial effects, 
compulsory pension insurance categories were expanded and •	
compulsory contributions were paid for authors’ fees and work in 
students’ cooperatives, which increased revenues by several billion 
dinars, 
certain categories of insurees’ huge benefits were reduced and, what •	
is more important, stricter and more narrow rights were introduced 
for disability pensions. This, together with greater control of 
exercising these rights significantly slowed down the inflow of new 
disability pensioners. Their current excessive number will, however, 
still burden the fund’s finances for a long time, 
with reference to insurance of agriculturalist, which is in •	
permanent collapse, insurance liability was reduced to only one 
household member and certain relaxations were granted for debts 
settling, which should have increased their interest in joining the 
system and paying the contributions. This however did not take 
place.
5. Slow implementation of former pension reforms, as well as certain 
deterioration of macroeconomic performances resulted in new changes 
in pension regulations in 2005, supported by IMF:
retirement requirements were tightened up, i.e. the age limit was •	
raised by two years, both for the old age and family pensions, 
which is a continuation of the age limit raising policy initiated in 
2001; the goal was again the same – to reduce the number of 
pensioners in the long-term; this change will be carried out in 
course of four years and all envisaged values should be reached 
by 2010, 
index allocation mechanism was altered: the Swiss formula •	
(equal weight of price and salary rise) was replaced by costs of 
living indexing. This is a radical conceptual change since pension 
rise would lag even more behind the salary rise. Hence, 
pensioners would not be able to take part in the country’s 
economic progress, but would be constantly maintained on the 
same real income level (this may not take place if inflation is 
high, and only twice a year due to revalorization); two solutions 
have been envisaged for transitional regime: firstly, transition 
from the Swiss formula to costs of living to be implemented 
gradually until 2009; secondly, by the end of 2008, the average 
pension should not be reduced to below 60% of the average 
salary, otherwise special corrections are to be made and average 
pension increased to 60%.
6. The 2005 amendments to pension regulations would result in sig-
nificant savings in a part depending on indexation and raising the age 
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limit, but only after 2010, when, on one hand, all pension fund debts are 
settled towards the pensioners and when, on the other hand, transi-
tional solutions give way to basic solutions that should come in force. 
Nonetheless, the application of this solution related to pension 
indexation by costs of living may not last long since pensions in Serbia 
are not very high and the expenditure control policy through non-in-
crease of real pensions may hardly be acceptable for a longer period of 
time in a poor, developing country. It is unfair to exclude for a long 
time one segment of the population from enjoying the economic 
growth results. Thus, there have been more and more requests lately 
urging for the change of indexation mechanism, even before it fully 
came into power. 
Speaking from the financial aspect, 2001, 2003 and 2005 reform 
changes of the pension system brought alleviation, but did not resolve 
fundamental, long-term issues related to its functioning. Moreover, 
changes resulting in biggest savings are very hard to sustain for a longer 
period of time, which implies that improvement of the pension system 
financial position is of a limited duration. 
BASIC ISSuES
7. There are two basic issues related to the Serbian pension system:
The first one is short/mid-term and of financial nature: high expendi-
tures (310.5 billion RSD in 2007), i.e. a very high share of Pension and 
Disability Insurance (PIO) system expenditures in the gross national 
product (12.5% GNP in 2007), which decreases the standard of living 
and hinders economic growth. This percentage is common in modern 
world – similar percentage is to be found in a number of European 
countries (Italy, Austria, France, etc.) – but there are also many coun-
tries with significantly lower burden. All countries with similar share 
undertake reforms to reduce it, to disburden economy and make it more 
competitive in the global market. 
The second one is long-term and demographic: the number of active 
insurees and pensioners ratio is deteriorating as time goes, which 
increases pension financing burden; this ratio in Serbia today is only 
1.6: 1, which implies that one pensioner is financed by 1.6 employees; 
this is partly caused by a very low employment rate in Serbia and partly 
by ageing of the population and worsened young to old people ratio. 
This ratio should be 3:1 or more for facilitated pension financing.
POSSIBLE SOLuTIONS 
We would review four options for overcoming these difficulties: the 
first two deal with short and medium-term and the other two with long-
term solutions. 
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8. The first option: do not undertake anything. It is based on a belief 
that pension system has been well adjusted in the course of the last 
reforms, that it cannot be significantly further improved without bigger 
social and political expenses and that it is necessary to wait for a certain 
period of time so that full positive effects of the current reforms are vis-
ible. This would, then, considerably improve the financial position of 
both pension system and pensioners themselves in medium-term and 
long-term period. 
The future effects of the age limit increase are in favor of this option 
that will downsize the number of pensioners. The current indexation 
mechanism would be able to improve even more radically the finan-
cial position of the pension system; however its longer duration is 
practically unachievable, due to this very radical characteristic and 
maintaining of pensioners at the current level of purchasing power. 
Since indexation will definitely be changed, then future effects of eco-
nomic growth on the pension system would depend on a chosen 
indexation mechanism. There is one cruel rule here: the more favor-
able indexation is for the pensioners, the less favorable it is for the 
pension system. Topical political agreement to increase the average 
pension to 70% of the average salary and return to indexation of pen-
sions by incomes is particularly risky since this will put a great pres-
sure on the Serbian budget. 
9. The second option: further changes of the current pension system 
parameters in restrictive direction. There is, however, not much room 
left for such changes after the latest changes to pension system in 2005. 
The age limit for retirement was raised to 65 for men, which is, in the 
long-run, an acceptable maximum not only due to political reasons, but 
also for social and health-related reasons. There is no maneuvering with 
pension indexation for further deceleration of real pensions’ growth. 
Moreover, it will change in a more favorable direction for pensioners. 
The financial position of the pension system may be enhanced by 
increased pension contribution rate. This is, nonetheless, usually 
avoided lest workforce becomes more expensive, competitiveness and 
investment attractiveness is worsened and employment fails to be 
stimulated. In addition, experiences show that tendency to avoid pay-
ment of contributions is seriously increased at contribution rates over 
20%, including the escape of the employees from the formal to the 
gray economy. 
The age limit for the retirement of women may be the only serious 
candidate for a more restrictive policy in the forthcoming period. It is 
now five years lower then with men in Serbia, which is obviously unfair 
and has been abandoned in the world, like in Slovenia for example. Par-
ticularly when we know that the average lifespan of women is longer 
than that of men. Obstacles to this change are exclusively of political 
character, i.e. the reluctance of governments so far to face probable 
women’s protests. 
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10. The third option: reform according to the so-called world 
Bank model, which has three pillars (components): 
state-run, non-funded, based on current financing and modest by •	
its range, as provision of minimal income in the old age, 
compulsory, private, capital funded, based on individual saving •	
accounts, and 
private voluntary.•	
The reasons that made the 2002 Government abandon this plan may 
be valid even today: 
it is neither certain nor proved in economic theory and other •	
countries’ experiences that this type of reforms resolve pension 
issue, i.e. bring benefits to both country and pensioners, 
this type of reform imply high transition cost since one generation •	
of employees should pay two pensions – of current pensioners and 
their future pension through savings, 
it is not certain that today’s insufficiently developed capital market •	
in Serbia would be able to sustain this high inflow of pension 
capital and ensure high return, and 
it is not certain that the current state’s regulatory and monitoring •	
capacity is sufficient to provide the proper functioning of the 
private pension funds.26
11. The forth option: capitalization of the existing pension sys-
tem, i.e. the creation of financial reserves that would be able to, at 
least partly, finance the future, ever greater, obligations towards pen-
sioners. The new investment fund should be the institution in charge. 
Resources for the fund would be provided by the state mainly from 
the public enterprises capital and shares left after privatization and 
they would bring return on investment (shares, bonds, etc.), and the 
fund would, at estimated moment, start (co)financing pension obliga-
tions of the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund. To sum up, it is 
easier to finance tomorrow’s pensions from an additional capital fund 
then without it. 
Many countries have such a fund. It has proved very successful in a 
number of developed countries (Canada, Ireland, France, New Zealand, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, etc.), on the basis of professional man-
agement and focused on commercial objective only during investing – 
maximization of yield. The crucial issue for Serbia is whether the fol-
lowing could be provided: (1) money for the fund, in a competition with 
various consumption forms, and (2) good fund management, which 
implies professionalism and without the state’s interference.27 
26 The Study will be completed soon by J. Bajec, G. Matković, B. Mijatović and K. 
Stanić: Introduction of compulsory private pension funds into the Serbian pension 
system – adequacy and feasibility, dealing with the issue. 
27 See a study by B. Mijatović: Capitalisation of the pension insurance in Serbia, 
CLDS, 2008.
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Apart from these huge conceptual issues, it is also necessary to resolve 
the important issues related to the agriculturalists’ insurance (low pay-
ment of contributions; alternatives: termination of unpopular insurance 
with insurees or serious intensifying of payments collection), military 
pensioners (issue related to integration into existing civilian system), 
pension administration efficiency (collection of payments, insurees’ 
registry, etc.), introduction of social pensions (for those without pen-
sion insurance; it would significantly increase the expenditures), etc. 
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Governance in Serbia: 
Key Obstacles for Its Improvement
1. The governance in Serbia is analyzed according to six basic ele-
ments, i.e. governance indicators:28 (1) democracy and accountability; 
(2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) government effective-
ness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption. 
Based on the available assessments, composite indices were established 
for each of the stated indicators (maximum value is 2.5 and minimum 
value –2.5; the higher the value, the better the governance).29
Table 1 
Governance quality
Governance 
criteria 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Democracy and 
accountability 0.12 0.11 0.14 –0.30 –0.29 –1.05 –1.45
Political stability 
and absence of 
violence
–0.91 –0.89 –0.90 –1.03 –1.33 –2.01 –1.29
Government 
effectiveness –0.31 –0.12 –0.50 –0.61 –0.80 –1.11 –0.71
Regulatory quality –0.53 –0.52 –0.68 –0.62 –0.90 –1.90 –1.45
Rule of law –0.81 –0.78 –0.97 –0.99 –1.14 –1.06 –1.26
Control of 
corruption –0.55 –0.55 –0.55 –0.77 –1.13 –1.03 –0.98
Evidently there was a significant and sustainable change for the better 
in Serbia in the last ten years and this finding cannot be affected even by 
certain fluctuations recorded after 2000. Even more so, since these fluc-
tuations are smaller than the standard error of estimation of each of the 
composite indicators.
 
28 Kaufmann, D. et al. (2006): Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators, World Bank Working Paper 
29 All the data downloaded from www.govindicators.org.
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2. The legislative power in Serbia has been formed at multiparty par-
liamentary elections since 1990. During the first years of multiparty 
system there were some problems in the election process itself but in 
time the elections became free and fair so, in that respect, Serbia is a 
mature democracy at present day. The existence of a proportional elec-
toral system (regardless of a relatively high census) enables a great num-
ber of relatively small parties to survive in the parliament i.e. it results in 
the need to create complex and often ideologically contradictory coali-
tions that affect the functioning of the executive power. It is probable 
that the advantages of a proportional electoral system in the early phases 
of a multiparty system have already been exhausted, so the issue of elec-
toral system reform arises probably in order to guide towards the intro-
duction of the elements of a majority electoral system.
3. A great number of presidential and parliamentary elections in Ser-
bia in the last eight years held without any significant incident and with 
power being peacefully handed down by those who lost, shows that Ser-
bia has entered a mature phase of democracy although accountability 
still, more or less, boils down to the elections. The freedom to express 
oneself and to organize enables the accountability. However, this 
accountability is made difficult by the media environment in Serbia 
which, although there is no strict government control, is still greatly 
influenced by the political parties and interest groups.
4. All the relevant political players in Serbia accept the political frame-
work defined by the constitution and the chances for political violence 
on that ground are very slim. The problems regarding the political insta-
bility and the chances for political violence to occur, exist in connection 
to political developments that are not directly linked to the political 
scene in Serbia and its competition (above all, the Kosovo status).
5. The National Assembly as the legislative body has not shown any 
greater self-initiative so far in the law making process, especially regard-
ing the influence on the content of the law, i.e. the coordination between 
the different laws that affect the same government policies. The domi-
nance of party politics i.e. the dominance of the executive power in the 
Assembly is reflected in the fact that a great number of laws has been 
passed at the Government’s proposal and at emergency sessions, with-
out public discussion and possibility to discuss argumentatively the 
good and the bad sides of the proposed law. The greatest number of 
laws was adopted in the same form as their proposal and the ruling 
majority in the Assembly provided the “voting machine”. Thus, by sav-
ing time, the number of laws passed has increased (especially in the 
period from 2004 through 2007) but there is a decline in the quality of 
legal solutions and their mutual compliance. The National Assembly 
practically does not have professional staff that could provide unbiased 
support partywise to the MPs, i.e. to the appropriate boards in the 
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discussion on the legal proposals. The national assembly institutional 
capacity building project did not come across the support of the MPs, 
i.e. the parliamentary political parties. 
 
6. The executive power in Serbia, especially since 2000, has been 
based on constituting large and fragile coalitions. This situation is a 
result of a fragmented Serbian political party scene and sustainable 
division of voters. That is why not a single political party can form the 
government independently, so they are forced to form a coalition. 
Therefore, these coalitions arise from necessity and usually there is 
not even an elemental ideological closeness between the coalition 
partners. Moreover, there is no mutual trust between the coalition 
partners which results in a so called vertical division of executive 
power in which a particular political party on its own completely con-
trols the ministry assign to it (“vertically”). In this manner a certain 
balance within the ruling coalition has been accomplished since every 
party is unrestricted in its own ministry. Such organization of execu-
tive power inevitably leads to its growing “politicalization” in a sense 
that there is a dominance of party policy over the interests of an effi-
cient executive power. Furthermore, such division diminishes the pos-
sibility of creating a professional, non-partisan public administration 
since there is a strong incentive to each political party to appoint “its 
people” to the ministry under its control. Although the introduction 
of a state secretary function and redefining of the position of assistant 
minister have been, at least allegedly, motivated by bringing profes-
sionalism into the state administration, it turned out that, among 
other things, due to such coalition structure and vertical division, it 
resulted in appointment of politically suitable staff.
7. The coalition trait of executive power (the coalition coming out of 
necessity and not ideological or program closeness) inevitably resulted 
in the fact that the executive power structure became absolutely subor-
dinate to the coalition needs in order for all the coalition partners to be 
satisfied. That is why the number and composition of ministries drasti-
cally varies i.e. the number and job description of the deputy Prime 
Minister, in order to find a suitable position for each key player. The 
functionality of solution comes second. Especially in the case of form-
ing the so called “super” ministries (like the Ministry for capital invest-
ments), it leads to neglect of certain areas which are not a priority for 
such ministries (like for example, utilities). Such organization of execu-
tive power is also very unstable since after each elections there are new 
elements for forming a coalition, i.e. new ambitions of coalition 
partners.
8. Such organization of executive power creates great problems in 
passing strategic decisions regarding the public policies, especially those 
that affect numerous sectors and thus, exceed the competence of one 
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ministry. The consultancy process is reduced solely to the fact that min-
istries give their opinion on, for example, a draft law. Those opinions 
are very often an element in the process of political trade in which the 
services between political parties that compose a coalition are exchanged. 
There is no formalized process for the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
which means there is no possibility to check the consequences of pass-
ing a certain regulation. Only the existence, i.e. the function of the Leg-
islative Secretariat provides some kind of internal consistency of regula-
tions proposed by the government i.e. their compliance with the Con-
stitution. Since a huge majority of laws are passed according to the 
“urgent procedure” the public discussion on the draft law where experts 
and all the stakeholders could express their opinion, comments and 
suggestions is becoming very uncommon. The ministries are not at all 
involved in the advocacy of the public policies they are proposing, either 
within the government itself, or in the wider public. The executive 
power does not feel the need to do anything like that at all. Everything 
mentioned is causing a very low quality level of the public policies i.e. 
the propositions of the laws submitted to the National Assembly by the 
executive power.
9. The executive power in Serbia is followed by an inherent political 
instability. Since the introduction of a multiparty pluralism in Serbia 
only one government has lasted the whole mandate and not a single 
government has managed to do that since 2000. Besides the already 
mentioned fragmented political scene, the instability is caused by 
numerous exogenous factors i.e. external political shocks. In such 
conditions, the executive power of a very uncertain duration and 
already mentioned incentives in the area of party politics is not 
encouraged to start a comprehensive public administration reform, 
since it is focused on obtaining the maximum benefit while in power 
with high discount rate. Although the Government has passed the 
Public Administration Reform Strategy the final goal of which is “to 
ensure a high quality service to the citizens and create such a state 
administration in Serbia that will greatly contribute to the economic 
stability and quality of the state standard”, it is evident that in case of 
the state administration reform the Government is focused on this 
segment of administration that directly communicates with the citi-
zens, and to a lesser extent to that state administration segment that 
would provide the increase of the governance quality, i.e. the business 
environment improvement.
10. Although the situation in the public administration is not satisfac-
tory, there is the impression that there is no considerable falling behind 
the other comparable countries, especially not after eight years of transi-
tion. It became evident during the preparation of the SAA (Stabilization 
and Association Agreement) that the administrative capacity of the pub-
lic administration is relatively high, especially compared to some other 
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countries in the region. However, considering the domination of the 
party politics in the process of passing and implementing the public pol-
icies, it is of key importance in Serbia to provide the strengthening of the 
public administration independent of the party politics and increasing 
its mandate in forming the public policies on one hand, and implement-
ing the public policies on the other, in order to provide the rule of law in 
the widest sense of the word i.e. the rule of unbiased laws and equality of 
all citizens before the law and those who enforce it.
11. The basic problems of the public administration come from its 
heritage, especially from the 1990-ies. While during the communist rule 
the public administration was relatively well developed and capable of 
accompanying the functioning of the state in the socio-economic sys-
tem of that time, the disappearance of that system brought, on one hand, 
completely new demands and a need to adjust the public administration 
to the new, and in many ways unfinished institutional framework, and 
on the other hand, completely discredited the state governed by the pri-
vate interest groups and thus the public administration itself. The afore-
mentioned discreditation followed by inadequate salary policy in the 
state sector lead to the adverse selection. On one hand, majority of the 
best civil servants transferred to work in appropriate jobs in the private 
sector that was able to offer much higher salaries. On the other hand, 
people without integrity joined the state administration to some extent 
and for them the possibility to earn money through corruption was far 
above the expected income from regular salary. Although this process 
was present in all the segments, this adverse selection was nowhere so 
evident as in (at that time, Federal) Customs Administration.
12. The unresolved government issues, like the future of the com-
mon state of Serbia and Montenegro, made the public administration 
reform (its modernization and professionalism) difficult, in a sense of 
separating it from party politics. The dissolution of the federal state, 
for example, lead to a drastic increase in the number of employees in 
the national public administration (from 8,000 to over 27,000), far 
exceeding the needs occurring with the transfer of functions from the 
federal to the republic level. It resulted in the need to solve the burn-
ing issue of surplus labor which pushed the essential state administra-
tion reform aside.
13. The key political decision-makers, i.e. the political parties do 
not see any benefit from the public administration reform and increas-
ing of its efficiency. For them, such administration represents only the 
limitation of the short-term goals realization while the long-term 
goals are not of greater importance under the conditions of high dis-
count rate of politicians. Therefore, until now the key players did not 
have an autochthonous motive to reform the state administration but 
they did that unwillingly, mostly under the pressure from the donors, 
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i.e. the international factors. In other words, there was no political will 
for a serious, thorough and comprehensive state administration reform 
and the little that was done was mostly due to the reduced maneuver-
ing space with regard to the international factors.
14. Even though the period of the worst adverse selection regarding 
the public administration was certainly over already at the beginning of 
this decade, there is still the problem of recreating the adequate public 
administration staff. Namely, the development and strengthening of the 
private sector in the country, especially with the creation of new jobs 
due to the foreign direct investments, leads to the salary increase for 
competent people, especially those seeking employment for the first 
time. The current state administration salary system is simply not com-
petitive and disables the administration to attract the most competent 
people. Besides, there are no specialized educational institutions for 
training the state administration staff at the level of specialized graduate 
studies (Masters).
15. The said situation in the public administration and rather gloomy 
prospects for its further reform and qualification directly affect the gov-
ernance, first of all in the area of support to the key decision makers in 
the process of formulating and applying the state policies, i.e. with 
regards to the governance. The key decisions are still made and imple-
mented according to the “political feeling” in the surrounding where 
administrative and professional capacities are still rather low. The deci-
sions are not made on the basis of topical discussion in which there 
would be a thorough analysis of both good and bad sides of every pos-
sible decision, i.e. the discussion where alternative options would be 
ranked and decisions made based on the concept of opportunity costs 
– what is missed by making a certain decision, i.e. by opting for a par-
ticular state policy.
16. New demands, i.e. challenges of governance that the state author-
ity (the executive power, primarily) is faced with, in conditions where 
little was done to reform the public administration, resulted in the fact 
that the existing public administration could not offer solutions for 
these demands in many segments. Since the existing institutions, i.e. 
state bodies could not successfully and quickly be reformed, all the gov-
ernments, starting from the year 2000, started establishing numerous 
new institutions (bodies), mostly new agencies and administrations. 
Even when the executive power was not directly competent for their 
establishment (like independent agencies, i.e. regulatory bodies), then it 
was the initiator, most frequently by proposing the appropriate law. Very 
often a surplus of bodies was formed, with unclear mandate and com-
petence that was overlapping with the already existent bodies. That was 
the result of two factors. First, the unclear concept, i.e. the state admin-
istration reform strategy – no one knew what the purpose was. Second, 
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the influence of the international factor; different representatives of 
international organizations i.e. different donor organizations were 
expressing their views on the “best practice”, that is to say, their opin-
ions on how the regulatory framework should be formed. The lack of 
local knowledge in this area, as well as the lack of motives to enter into 
the discussion and potential conflict with the international factors, 
enhanced their activity even more.
17. The new regulatory bodies and the process of their establish-
ment were accompanied by numerous problems, like providing the 
appropriate financing (budgetary funds) and adequate business prem-
ises; the establishment also became more difficult because of the 
search for suitable personnel acceptable to all. The delay in establish-
ing the regulatory bodies was also accompanied by slowness, actually 
by falling behind in passing the appropriate bylaws (at all levels: legis-
lative power, executive power and the regulatory bodies themselves), 
so the newly formed regulatory bodies, even though they were estab-
lished, could not start working and fulfilling their duties. Hence, those 
who were primarily supposed to take into account the enforcement of 
law, by their behavior caused the situation where the laws that came 
into effect were not implemented. This resulted in a paradox – instead 
of reducing the regulatory uncertainty, which was allegedly the idea 
behind the establishment of new regulatory bodies, it was increased 
since there was no sign as to when, for example, the legislative body or 
the executive power would pass the appropriate bylaws. The technical 
part of this problem could probably be solved with the introduction of 
a suspensive effect category (concerning the entry into force – vacca-
cio legis), although it is necessary to ensure that those who pass the 
bylaws have a strong incentive to do that before the suspensive effect 
deadline expires.
18. A huge number of newly established regulatory bodies have the 
status of independent bodies i.e. the bodies that are, or should be more 
independent from the partisan politics and private business interests 
than the executive power,. The main precondition of regulatory body 
independence is to be elected by the parliament and not appointed by 
the government. The results of a detailed analysis of the independence 
degree of Serbian regulatory bodies, based on the generally accepted 
modern technology, are given in the table below.
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Box 1 
Securities Commission
Securities Commission was established in 1990 and the members are appointed and 
dissolved by the National Assembly. So, the Commission belongs to the independent 
(of executive power) regulatory bodies. It is under its competence to regulate all the 
securities transactions, i.e. all the procedures in those transactions. The Commission 
has sufficient competence but not a complete regulatory capacity so it could not be 
said that Commission is adequately fulfilling its competencies. In many cases, 
however, there is no way for the Commission to directly implement its decision. For 
example, the Commission may order the enterprise to publish the prospectus but it 
cannot force the enterprise to do that, in other words, it does not have the mechanisms 
to punish the enterprise that avoids doing that. Furthermore, in some situations the 
Commission has no wider range of possibilities for punishment, and it can apply 
only the most severe one (for example, taking the permit away from a broker), and 
that is why it is abstaining from any such measure. The party in the dispute in which 
the Commission makes the decision or declares a sanction, has the right to institute 
an administrative dispute (a perfectly excusable procedure of including the next 
instance), but instituting the administrative dispute prevents the enforcement. Also, 
the Commission has little possibility to work on the prevention of market disruptions, 
for example, in the case of “market integrity protection”, primarily caused by 
manipulative activity.
The Commission has a possibility, in accordance with the law, to pass the bylaws. 
However, the current version of the Law on Securities has considerably limited the 
original competence of the Commission in creating the regulatory norm, primarily 
concerning the different rulebooks that define the manner of work, i.e. the way the 
Commission itself has to act in different cases. By charging the legally prescribed 
fees, the Commission acquires original revenues that are higher than its expenditures, 
but has no possibility to autonomously manage its revenues and define its budget. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s independence regarding the personnel is also in 
danger since the process of candidacy and selection is performed in the Assembly 
but under great influence of the political parties. The number of Commission 
employees is not sufficient, even more so since many of them are not qualified in 
order to perform efficient work in this regulatory body.
The main dilemma concerning the future of this body is the concept of the 
financial services regulation. The growing number of countries is opting for a 
concept of one regulator of integrated financial services that, along with the securities 
market and its organizations, would include the banking services, insurance etc. 
Such concept means the central bank would be reduced to its monetary policy 
function. The outset of such integrated regulator however, may be within the central 
bank itself; in other words, establishing a separate department of the central bank for 
regulation of integrated financial services
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Table 2 
Independence of regulatory bodies
Title
Condition 
to get 1 
point
Commission 
for Protection 
of Competition
Broadcasting 
Council
Energy 
Agency
Telecom-
munications 
Agency
Securities 
Commission
The President 
and the 
members are 
elected by the 
Assembly 
yes 1 1 1 1 1
Members are 
proposed 
exclusively by 
the 
government 
no 1 1 0 0 1
Technical 
knowledge of 
the area 
requested 
yes 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed 
presidential 
mandate 
yes 1 1 1 1 1
Possibility of 
a second 
mandate 
yes 0 1 0 0 0
Duration of 
the mandate >3 years 1 1 1 1 1
The 
government’s 
consent on 
the budget is 
necessary 
no 1 1 0 0 1
Someone’s 
consent 
regarding the 
pricelist is 
necessary 
no 1 0 1 0 1
Passing 
decisions in 
collective 
manner 
yes 1 1 1 1 1
Complaint 
exclusively to 
the court 
yes 1 1 0 1 1
“Quarantine" 
after the 
mandate has 
expired
yes 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 
points  9/11 9/11 6/11 6/11 9/11
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19. The scores in the table show several things. Firstly, from a formal 
point of view, the institutions are relatively highly independent. Sec-
ondly, those that perform the task that practically no one has performed 
before them are more “independent”. Two institutions (dealing with 
energy and telecommunications) are significantly less independent that 
the other three according to this analysis. The possible explanation is 
that this was the case of transferring the competences from the minis-
tries that were unwilling to accept that and thus, contributed to the fact 
that even the formal independence was at a lower level.
Box 2 
Commission for Protection of Competition
The passing of the Law on Protection of Competition in 2005 facilitated the 
establishment of a modern body that is supposed to deal with antimonopoly policy, 
i.e. the policy of competition protection. The problem is that the Law is inappropriate 
since many of its provisions are not well formulated. Since the law prescribes a very 
low threshold for notification , i.e. concentration approval, the Commission was 
swamped with a huge number of requests from the start which resulted in unnecessary 
delay of the concentrations (mergers and acquisitions i.e. takeovers). There was a 
financial incentive for such behavior since according to the Commission pricelist 
there was a high charge for these “services”. The Commission’s competence is too 
wide and it was focusing on the most controversial area of competition protection 
policy (concentration control) and spent a lot of effort on a couple of big cases, 
instead of dealing with far easier and indisputable issues in the area of competition 
protection, like abuse of dominant position and especially, horizontal agreements, 
i.e. cartels. The Commission does not have the right to punish but only to order the 
restoration of the previous condition. Punishing, by a very odd legal solution, belongs 
to the competence of the low level administrative courts. Still, the Commission’s 
competence is very wide and it is not adequately fulfilled since there are no essential 
resources. The wrong strategic decisions within the Commission itself led to such 
Commission’s operation. Although the comparative experience showed that the 
bodies for the protection of competence should concentrate in their early phase on 
the advocacy of the competition protection idea, the Commission did not address 
that issue at all.
The Commission has very high revenue, since it is charging for its services. A 
very low threshold for registering the concentration and a huge number of cases in 
which the Commission considers the concentration and charges for this service 
resulted in the revenue that is higher than the expenditure. However, the Commission 
does not have a sufficient number of employees, especially if one is to consider the 
staff competence. Namely, the greatest number of employees of the Commission is 
taken from the former federal Antimonopoly Commission and is simply not capable 
of performing the tasks of competition protection in the market economy.
Although the law is comprehensive, its implementation is linked to numerous 
bylaws. So far a certain number of acts have been passed and from a formal point of 
view, they are enabling the enforcement of the Law but in essence, they are deficient 
since they do not prescribe appropriately the actions and procedures like, for 
example, the procedure for defining the relevant market. Also, some of the bylaws 
which are of key importance for the improvement of the Commission’s work have 
not been passed, like the Enactment on banned agreements which are exempt from 
the ban.
103Governance in Serbia: Key Obstacles for Its Improvement
20. Judiciary, as the third branch of government, is of special impor-
tance for good governance, since this branch of government has, within 
the division of power, a control function over the other two branches of 
government, primarily over executive power. Moreover, the judiciary is 
one of the basic components of the rule of law as one of the key ele-
ments of good governance. The judiciary is faced with numerous 
assaults on its independence which is best seen in political struggles 
concerning the manner of appointing, or removing the judges. These 
struggles should also be seen in the light of inherited personnel struc-
ture in judiciary, the one that was to be found in judiciary bodies in 
2000. On one hand, political parties, i.e. the legislative and executive 
power, wanted to control not only the election process but the candi-
dacy of the judges and the initiation of the process of their removal to 
the greatest extent possible. Such control of the personnel issues would 
enable the ruling political parties to control this branch of government; 
in other words, it would jeopardize its independence. On the other 
hand, the dominance of the Great personnel council regarding the pro-
posal process would provide that the judges themselves completely con-
trol the process of electing new colleagues. Thus, the basis for reproduc-
tion of dissatisfactory judicial personnel structure is created, as well as 
for avoiding the lustration process which was initiated several times. 
Moreover, there is a widespread opinion within the judicial system that 
the judicial independence means that judiciary is not accountable to 
anyone for its work.
 
21. During the 1990-ies the judiciary experienced a strong negative 
selection. Whereas during the one-party socialist system the judiciary 
had a certain reputation and the judges had a decent financial and social 
status, none of that remained with the introduction of a multiparty sys-
tem and progress of the market economy. The degradation of reputa-
tion and relative income made many judges, the better ones mostly, to 
opt for a private practice where they could earn much more. Further-
more, the participation of judiciary in political, especially election 
manipulations, lessened their reputation. Such features of the personnel 
structure add a special element to consideration of the independence 
issue.
22. The organization of judiciary is not adequate. From the territorial 
organization aspect, a wide network of courts with a great number of 
judges was inherited. The number of judges is the same as in Argentina 
(with almost five times more people and a federal structure of the state), 
and six times more than in Denmark (a country with somewhat smaller 
population and 7.5 times bigger GDP). At the same time, there is a great 
backlog of cases. The main reason is because the judges are inefficient 
since there is no team work culture. In most of the cases the judge is 
“one man band”, meaning he/she does all the additional tasks that the 
court clerks are supposed to do for him. The reasons for the lack of 
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cooperation can be found on both sides. Furthermore, regardless of the 
lack of this immediate cooperation, the quality of court clerks, to the 
extent to which they perform the tasks, in no way contributes to the 
efficiency of judiciary.
23. Many organizational changes in judiciary that were planned and 
stipulated by law have simply not been implemented. The administra-
tive court, as a second instance court in the case of administrative pro-
ceedings, was not established and the burden was not taken from the 
Supreme Court regarding its present appeal function. That is why the 
Supreme Court, consisting of a great number of judges, cannot focus on 
its main functions and that is the improvement and provision of unifor-
mity of judicial practice. Moreover, the Supreme Court is not active in 
advocacy of judiciary and its interests. Instead it is reduced to public 
exchange of accusations with the representatives of executive power, 
mostly through the media. The longstanding and consistent negation of 
the existence of corruption and other abuses in the judiciary after the 
unveiling of such cases, even in the case of a Supreme Court judge him-
self, did a lot of damage to the Supreme Court’s reputation and the repu-
tation of the judicial power as a whole.
24. The research showed that, from the beneficiary’s point of view, 
inefficiency and incompetence are bigger problems of judiciary power 
than the corruption itself. A part of the inefficiency problem lies in 
inadequate process rules. The passing of new laws that simplify and 
accelerate the procedure resulted in significant progress regarding the 
judiciary efficiency (the average time for enforcing contractual compli-
ance is reduced for more than 1/3).
25. The Government of Serbia adopted the National Judicial Reform 
Strategy. Independent of the content of the Strategy, which is a very 
general document, there is a feeling that it was adopted “under pres-
sure” from the international factors and that the executive power itself 
had no strong political will to dedicate itself to this job. This is indirectly 
seen from the fact that two years after the adoption of this strategy very 
little has been done to implement it even though the strategy itself 
anticipates short-term measures that were supposed to be implemented 
by the end of the last year inclusive.
26. The basic dilemma regarding the improvement of administration 
through judicial reform is whether the political parties actually want the 
judiciary to reform. To great extent it depends on the political parties’ 
goals i.e. whether strong, independent and efficient judiciary can con-
tribute or hinder the fulfillment of those goals. It is to be expected that 
further stabilization of political party scene, its gathering into bulks, 
and extending the time horizons of political parties (lowering their dis-
count rate) will create political incentives for judiciary reform in that 
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sense. Regarding the foreign issues, the process of approximation to the 
EU represents an additional incentive for such measures, both within 
the framework defined by the SAA and the framework that could poten-
tially provide Serbia with the status of the candidate country for the 
membership.
27. The level of corruption in Serbia declined after the peak it prob-
ably reached in 2000. Independent research of the entrepreneurs showed 
that there was a decline not only in the spread of administrative corrup-
tion (measured by the number of corruption transactions) but in its 
intensity, too (measured by the average size of the bribe). Indirect state 
policies regarding the fight against corruption, primarily linked to the 
state policies in the area of liberalization and deregulation (prices, for-
eign trade etc.) as well as the state policies in the area of public procure-
ment, diminished the incentives to the companies to act corruptively 
i.e. the incentives to the civil servants to obtain bribe by extortion or 
collusion.
Box 3  
The Anti-Corruption Council
The Anti-Corruption Council is established as advisory body of the Government of 
Serbia with the mandate to “oversee the activities in the fight against corruption, to 
propose … measures to be taken … and monitor their implementation and give 
initiatives”. However, the activities of the Council so far have been directed towards 
specific cases of corruption and in those cases the Council took an investigative 
function. Moreover, the analysis of the cases the Council has chosen, show that the 
issue was not only the alleged corruption but different non-corruptive forms of law 
violations were considered, and in many cases certain state policies were examined 
(privatization policy, for example) from the aspect of their social relevance. Such 
deviations from the basic competence led to the conflict within the Council itself (a 
great number of people left this body) but it also led to the conflict with the founder 
– the Government of Serbia.
One of the main complaints of the Council regarding the founder was that the 
financing was insufficient and irregular but the justification of such a complaint can 
only be seen on the basis of a clear mandate and agenda. Even more so since there was 
an unresolved issue within the Council itself as to whether its members should work 
on voluntary basis or be paid for it. Certainly in a situation when high-quality associates 
have not been professionally engaged, it is not possible to obtain high-quality legal and 
economic analysis which is evident from the available Council’s reports. The Council 
itself practically has no employees and to a great extent, everything comes down to 
voluntary work.
Obviously, the Council’s work has not been accompanied by appropriate bylaws but 
the main problem originates from disrespect of the bylaw by which the Council was 
established. It is certain that the Council, as it is, has no future, but there is still the open 
issue of advisory function since the proposed solution for the Agency for Fight against 
Corruption does not cover that function.
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28. There is no reliable data on political corruption developments 
(regardless of whether it is administrative corruption or state capture). 
Although the political parties gladly put this topic on their agenda and 
use it for political struggle, especially during the pre-election campaign, 
public opinion researches do not show that the corruption issue is of 
crucial importance for the voters, that is to say, they do not consider it 
to be the greatest social problem (it is ranked only at 4th place). Most 
probably the political parties estimated that this kind of insistence on 
corruption phenomenon (regardless of whether someone is in power or 
not) brings good results to political rating. Still, one should not make 
definite conclusions about the existence and degree of political corrup-
tion based on that.
 
29. Besides definitive success achieved regarding the indirect policies 
of fight against corruption, for direct measures the success was disput-
able. There was a lot of wandering about on that issue, especially as to 
whether the direct fight against corruption should be left exclusively to 
the “classic” bodies of state (police, prosecution, courts) or the new, spe-
cialized anti-corruption institutions should get more involved in that. 
While in the first period after the year 2000, the new specialized anti-
corruption institutions were rather popular, the experience with the 
Anti-Corruption Council led to the turning towards the “classical” insti-
tutions, which were undoubtedly successful in the last couple of years in 
unveiling corruption hubs in the public administration (wrongly called 
“the mafias”).
30. The National Assembly adopted two key laws regarding the direct 
fight against corruption, political corruption above all, and those are 
the Law on Financing Political Parties and Law on Prevention of Con-
flict of Interest. Still waiting to be adopted is the proposal of the Law on 
the Agency for Fight against Corruption the mandate of which would 
be the implementation of exactly these two laws. The Law on Financing 
Political Parties is too restrictive, so all the political parties have an 
“alibi” not to implement it consistently while the penalty provisions of 
the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest are too mild. If the pro-
posal of the Law on the Agency for Fight against Corruption is adopted, 
the mandate of the existing Anti-Corruption Council will cease, which 
means that even the nominal, advisory function of this body will be 
lost, that is, the executive power will no longer be in a position to receive 
institutionalized opinions on the possibilities for the fight against 
corruption.
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Box 4 
Public Procurement Office
Pursuant to the Public Procurement Law adopted in 2003 two new bodies were 
established, the Public Procurement Office and the Commission for the Protection 
of Bidders’ Rights. The Public Procurement Office was established as a separate 
organization of the Government of the Republic of Serbia whose job was to establish 
a system of public procurement that will be economical, efficient and transparent 
and enable the strengthening of competition, equal treatment for all bidders and 
eradication of corruption. The Commission for Protection of Rights (formerly the 
Commission for the Protection of Bidders’ Rights) was established with the aim to 
protect the rights of bidders and public interest in all the phases of the proceedings 
for the granting of public procurement agreement. Neither the Public Procurement 
Office nor the Commission may be considered as independent bodies, since the 
head of the Office, i.e. the members of the Commission are appointed by the 
Government. The proposal of the new Public Procurement Law that is to be adopted 
in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia changes the current solution 
considerably. Namely, the members of the Commission for the Protection of Bidders’ 
Rights will be elected by the National Assembly at the Government’s proposal.
Since the Law started being implemented there was an evident improvement 
regarding the transparency and competition compared to the period before the 
adoption of the Law. Competitive measures like publishing the public invitation and 
free competition among the bidders increased their share from 0 % in 2001 to 36% in 
2002 in order to reach 73% in 2006.
However, there are many technical problems in the implementation. Namely, the 
area is very complex and the institutions in Serbia are not used to conducting 
procurement in line with the procedures prescribed in advanced. That is why there 
was a huge pressure on the Public Procurement Office in a sense that they were asked 
to explain and give advice but they did not have the capacity to fully respond to these 
demands. As an illustration of the problems facing the Office we mention the data 
from 2005: there were 80,000 bidders, 12,000 ordering parties and 250,000 
agreements. There are around 25 employees in the Public Procurement Office and it 
is quite clear that the Office cannot deal alone with all the problems relating to the 
public procurement.
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